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Causes of the Crisis and 
Crisis Management
While trying to recover from a financial 
crisis, Europe is hit by a major sovereign 
debt crisis, whose main causes are to be 
traced to structural problems, especially in 
the South. While contributing to the crisis, 
speculation  in  credit  swap  markets  and 
government bond spreads were not its root 
causes. Drastic revisions in Greek deficit 
forecasts following the Greek elections late 
last year, coupled with a tainted reputa-
tion for misreporting economic statistics, 
served to focus attention on Greece’s fiscal 
fundamentals,  including  the  country’s 
ability to collect tax revenues – the very 
aspect that guarantees sovereign debt. This 
ability was doubted, because of massive tax 
evasion and considerable corruption in the 
tax collection mechanism; and because of 
low productivity and heavy reliance of the 
private sector on public sector projects and 
funds.
Ironically, both the German and the Greek 
governments  were  blamed  for  delayed 
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reaction  to  the  crisis,  that  significantly 
aggravated the crisis. Politically, this criti-
cism does not seem justified: German tax-
payers were particularly averse to dishing 
out funds for a country characterized by 
excessive spending, limited tax and pension 
contributions,  antiquated  and  generous 
labor market and retirement rules. Greek 
voters,  on  the  other  hand,  would  not 
have accepted the current harsh measures 
immediately  following  Greek  elections 
where  unnecessarily  huge  pre-election 
promises were made. 
Economically, perhaps the unusually high 
spreads  in  early  May  could  have  been 
avoided  through  earlier  concerted  Euro-
pean action. Yet, at the time of writing, and 
despite available funds and apparent ECB 
purchases of Greek bonds, spreads remain 
quite high, reflecting market uncertainty 
as  to  whether  Greece  will  be  able  to 
repay loans even at a 5% interest rate. If 
the  market  is  right,  the  current  spreads 
are induced by fundamentals and not by 
inaction.  The  criticism  could  be  valid, 
though, if the market’s current assessment 
of sovereign risk is partly due to the erratic 
behavior  of  governments  as  they  were 
groping for an agreement.
Timing issues aside, there is little doubt that 
the safety net and associated ECB purchases 
of sovereign bonds were unavoidable, given 
the risk of contagion to other European 
countries with similar but less pronounced 
structural debt problems, and the threat 
to stability of the currency union. Indeed, 
buying government debt does not mean per 
se that the ECB has lost its independence. 
Independence is questioned if the ECB is 
forced to accept higher inflation in viola-
tion of its stated targets – a development it 
currently rules out. However, much more 
is needed to ensure that debt gets repaid 
and such problems do not recur.
More is needed – Now
Emergency  debt  refinancing  measures 
need  to  be  combined  with  changes  that 
ensure longer-run fiscal viability and ability 
to generate tax revenues, in order to meet 
debt obligations and achieve debt retire-
ment. The alternative of a transfer union 
seems politically unworkable and economi-
cally very costly, given the transfer union’s 
detrimental effects on fiscal discipline and 
reduced incentives of net payers. This is 
especially so if transfers are not used to 
smooth  temporary  imbalances  in  either 
direction. The  other  alternative,  namely 
default on sovereign debt, carries with it a 
heavy stigma that could cut off European 
countries (not only Greece) from impor-
tant sources of future financing and would 
most likely also lead to the break-up of the 
Eurozone, the scenario the current crisis 
management wanted to avoid. The stigma is 
especially pronounced when default cannot 
be attributed to exogenous factors, such as 
a world financial crisis, but to bad domestic 
institutions and practices. 
Massive  reforms  are  needed  to  ensure 
future  increases  in  productivity,  growth, 
and  competitiveness,  so  that  European 
countries can generate the funds to meet 
future obligations, reduce debt levels, and 
offer  their  people  hope  for  the  future. 
Without  such  reforms,  the  current  cuts 
in fiscal expenditures and nominal wages, 
as  well  as  the  increases  in  consumption 
taxes  simply  reduce  disposable  income, 
raise  unemployment,  and  create  a  deep 
recession with massive costs that jeopardize 
social cohesion.
At the core is fiscal coordination that does 
not prevent fiscal competition. Rules for 
setting limits on government spending and 
for  designing  methods  of  tax  collection 
should be harmonized with reference to 
best practices. Restraints on fiscal deficit 
and debt levels need to be monitored very 
closely and in a timely fashion. The rules of 
the competitive economic game should be 
simplified and harmonized, with emphasis 
on  providing  equal  opportunities,  sound 
incentives,  and  rewards  for  productive 
effort  rather  than  political  favors.  Labor 
market  rigidities  should  be  abolished, 
including ‘closed professions’ and groups 
with  preferential  treatment  based  on 
political power, in order to allow access 
to outsiders and to improve flexibility and 
hence productivity in European economies. 
Clear  incentives  to  invest  financial  and 
human capital in the private sector should 
be provided and bureaucratic procedures 
(e.g., for setting up a business) should be 
drastically simplified. The pension system 
needs to be modernized and rationalized, 
reducing implicit public debt (which is far 
larger than the official debt figures in many 
European  countries),  an  urgent  task  in 
rapidly aging European societies. 
A  big  danger  is  that  these  structural 
reforms are seen as needed only ‘over the 
longer run’. Contrary to Keynes’ famous 
dictum,  Europe  actually  needs  to  make 
sure it survives in the long run, and this is 
a process that starts today. Europe needs to 
act not only as a tough lender but also as 
a coordination device that helps countries 
to move towards sound fiscal behavior. If 
all that happens today is the misery of tax 
collection and wage reduction, a number of 
countries can be drawn into a deflationary 
spiral; and countries such as Greece may 
exhibit a form of hysteresis, whereby they 
lose some of their most productive people 
and dynamic and internationally competi-
tive firms. In a crisis, such losses occur fairly 
quickly as people re-optimize, but they are 
difficult to reverse. In sum, Europe as a 
whole  needs  to  use  this  crisis  in  a  way 
consistent with the many positive meanings 
of the word in the ancient Greek language 
where it originated: test, judgment, choice, 
competition, and resolution.
Michael Haliassos and Uwe WalzCFS Strategy 2010| Research and Policy
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CFS Strategy 2010
CFS  is  in  the  process  of  redefining  its 
role within the House of Finance. More 
emphasis is being put on the cooperation 
with the different entities – institutes and 
departments – in the House. The aim is 
to  eventually  create  synergy  effects  for 
all parties involved, thus contributing not 
only to research excellence, but also to 
research relevance. 
CFS’ role remains anchored in its mission 
statement, stressing its role as an inde-
pendent research institution with a strong 
international orientation. CFS builds on 
its  experience  as  a  forum  for  dialogue 
between academia, policy-making institu-
tions and the financial community. CFS’ 
role is being recognized and valued in- 
and outside the academic community, in 
Germany and abroad.
Since  its  foundation,  CFS  has  been 
active as an important bridge, not only 
between  the  finance  and  money  group 
at the University, but also between the 
academic world and the main private and 
governmental institutions around us. CFS 
has  several  long-standing  cooperation 
projects, e.g. with central banks, private 
and public sector banks, and key finan-
cial sector institutions. CFS will further 
develop its network within academia and 
the financial industry in Europe. 
Besides running lecture series, workshops 
and conferences, CFS will extend its role 
in  inducing  and  generating  high-quality 
research with an eye on policy relevance 
in  key  areas  of  financial  and  monetary 
economics.  Several  initiatives  will  help 
to provide additional effective stimuli for 
research and dialogue. 
Our research facilities will be enhanced by 
a CFS Research Visitors Program and 
a CFS Data Center (more information 
can be found on page 4). In addition to 
that, the existing research programs will 
get a “remake”, with fewer research areas 
and  stronger  emphasis  on  cooperation 
among researchers and across disciplines. 
The  idea  is  that  a  network  (both 
internationally  and  locally)  of  research 
fellows and affiliates is built around each 
research area. The networks, each headed 
by  a  Research  Professor,  will  apply  for 
projects and funding and will set up their 
research  program.  The  five  research 
networks currently envisaged are:
1. Household Finance 
2. Financial Stability and Banking 
  Regulation 
3. Law & Economics of Financial 
  Organizations
4. Monetary Policy
5. Economics of Trading in Financial Markets
CFS  will  also  contribute  considerably 
to  facilitating  research  by  providing 
“logistic”  support  for  the  research 
activities in the areas and their networks. 
With the Program Network Support 
initiative, CFS will assist in the submission 
process  for  research  grants  by  writing 
and subsequent monitoring of research 
proposals. This central contact point will 
work closely with the research networks 
and  will  look  at  the  opportunities  for 
network building and support.
Not to forget, CFS is a co-founder of 
and an active participant in the recently 
established House of Finance Policy 
Platform,  jointly  run  by  researchers 
from the House of Finance with a strong 
experience in policy advisory. CFS’ role 
in fostering policy relevance is assisted 
by  another  new  initiative  which  links 
its  activities  to  the  University’s  Ph.D. 
programs  in  Economics,  Finance  and 
Law. 
This  is  the  planned  CFS-GSEFM 
Policy  Research  Network,  which 
will  develop  a  direct  linkage  between 
policy debate and academic research.
New 
Program 
Networks
Program 
Network 
Support
Research 
Visitors 
Program
Data 
Center
CFS-GSEFM 
Policy 
Research 
Network 4
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As part of its new strategy, CFS 
is  launching  a  new  program  of 
Research Visitors,  at  two  levels: 
Senior and Junior. In both cases, the 
program is intended to provide an 
opportunity for useful exchanges 
and  transfer  of  knowledge  that 
promote  research  within  CFS 
research networks but also among 
graduate  students  and  Goethe 
faculty at large.
Senior Visitors
Senior visitors will be invited to spend a short period at CFS, 
usually two weeks. During this period, they will be asked to give 
a graduate minicourse, intended to communicate to graduate 
students and faculty the latest research tools, methods, and 
results in the area of the research visitor. Typically, the material 
will be drawn from the latest papers in the current research 
field of the visitor. The minicourses will be open to students 
and faculty of CFS, any CFS fellows in residence at the time 
of the visit, and possibly to individuals from selected Frankfurt 
institutions with which CFS has reciprocal arrangements for 
access to data or to researchers. In addition, senior visitors 
will be asked to give either one research seminar at Goethe 
University or a CFS public lecture to the broader Frankfurt 
financial community. The choice will depend on the field of 
the visitor and its likely appeal to the research and practitioner 
community. Finally, visitors agree to be available for discussions 
on research with CFS fellows, Senior and Junior, as well as 
with interested faculty at Goethe University. The visits will be 
typically funded through external funds, and such funding will 
be explicitly recognized when advertising the research visit.
Junior Visitors
Junior visitors will typically be young researchers who have 
finished  their  Ph.D.  and  are  currently  doing  interesting 
research in one of the CFS research networks. They will be 
visiting typically for periods of 6 months to 2 years, and their 
main  obligation  will  be  to  work  on  their  research  papers 
and to provide positive externalities (but not regular formal 
teaching) to students and faculty at Goethe University. The 
latter may include contributions to our Data Center (e.g., in 
the form of data or programs), a few lectures on new issues 
or techniques with which they are familiar, collaboration in 
the  organization  of  research  conferences  or  seminar  series, 
and other related activities. Junior visitors will be paid at rates 
comparable to those of researchers at Goethe University. In 
addition to external funds made available to it by its sponsors, 
it is envisaged that CFS will apply, in due course, to funding 
agencies, such as the European Union Marie Curie program for 
postdoctoral fellows.
The New CFS Program of Research Visitors
The  creation  of  the  CFS  Data 
Center is one of the main pillars 
of the new CFS strategy to foster 
the production of research in the 
area  of  financial  and  monetary 
economics. Access to high-quality 
data sets is a necessary condition 
for top quality research in many 
parts of these two fields. Thus, the 
CFS Data Center is likely to be a 
valuable  resource  for  the  entire 
CFS community, including not only 
CFS researchers, but also their visitors and fellows based outside 
the CFS. It is envisaged that this data center will complement 
other initiatives being pursued under the new strategy.
The  CFS  Data  Center  will  host  data  from  three  different 
sources:  commercial  data  sets;  data  sets  that  are  publicly 
available free of charge; and proprietary data sets.
Commercial Data Sets
Based on the expertise and the underlying demand in the new 
research networks, we aim to provide commercial data sets that 
are in high demand in the main areas of research at CFS. These 
data sets are intended to complement the existing data sources 
already provided under the data pool sponsored by the House 
of  Finance  and  the  Department  of  Business Administration 
and Economics at Goethe University. CFS will thus offer a 
complementary source of research information that links itself 
with other entities at the House of Finance and beyond.
The New CFS Data Center
by Michael Haliassos 
by Uwe Walz5
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Publicly available Data Sets 
In  a  number  of  fields,  data  sets  are  freely  available  to  the 
public. Often, they require some polishing and/or interfaces 
in order to make their application much less demanding and 
less time-consuming. Thus, the polishing of data sets and the 
setting up of (web-based) interfaces will be at the core of the 
activities of the staff of the CFS Data Center. A future way of 
producing valuable data sources from publicly available data 
will be to merge respective data sets (e.g. across countries) in 
a consistent manner.
Proprietary Data Sets
In a significant number of cases, valuable proprietary data sets 
have been set up by members of the CFS community which, 
however, are clearly underused (e.g. due to fact that people 
move  on  to  other  research  areas  or  focus  on  only  certain 
aspects of a data set). This would include, for example, data 
on share prices and listed German companies for the period 
1880 to 1950. The main contribution of the CFS Data Center 
here will be to polish these data sets and to make them more 
accessible by providing proper interfaces and data descriptions 
and other necessary documentation.
Altogether, the CFS Data Center will not just be a provider of 
data sets, but rather a comprehensive service center; one which 
ensures that data access is more user friendly and, therefore, 
more attractive.
The CFS-GSEFM Policy Research Network
The inaugural “Global Economic and Financial Policy Series” 
lecture by Citigroup Chief Executive Officer Vikram Pandit in 
October 2009 was the first event organized jointly by CFS and 
the Graduate School of Economics, Finance, and Management 
(GSEFM). Through his speech, Pandit triggered a lively discussion 
with GSEFM graduate students on issues of financial innovation, 
financial regulation and the future of banking. The event was 
highly successful (see also Newsletter 2/09) and has inspired 
CFS and GSEFM to widen their cooperation. As part of this 
widened cooperation, CFS and GSEFM have agreed to launch 
the  new  “Policy  Research  Network”,  aimed  at  stimulating 
research on key aspects of economic and financial policy. The 
new  CFS-GSEFM  Policy  Research  Network  will  link  to  the 
“Policy Platform” already established at the House of Finance 
(HoF), providing the doctoral students at GSEFM with various 
forms of structured interaction with internationally recognized 
senior researchers and policy makers.
The  HoF  Policy  Platform  −  founded  in  2009  by  CFS,  the 
Institute  for  Financial  and  Monetary  Stability  as  well  as  the 
Institute  for  Law  and  Finance  −  is  currently  operating  a 
website  featuring  policy  commentaries  and  OpEds  written 
by academics from within the HoF, the Faculty of Economics and 
Business Administration, as well as the Faculty of Law at Goethe 
University (see also page 7).
GSEFM − founded in 2008 − constitutes an alliance between 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Johannes Gutenberg University 
Mainz  and  Technical  University  Darmstadt.  GSEFM  aims 
to  realize  the  three  universities’  joint  vision  to  establish  a 
premier European center for quantitative and research-oriented 
graduate-level education in economics, finance and management. 
Leveraging the achievements of Goethe University’s established 
and highly successful Ph.D. Program in Economics, GSEFM’s 
overarching  objective  is  to  produce  outstanding  economists 
capable of taking leading positions in academia or serving as 
experts in international institutions, government and the private 
sector (see also www.gsefm.eu).
The CFS-GSEFM Policy Research 
Network  will  involve  summer 
institutes  and  other  forms  of 
structured  interaction  between 
GSEFM doctoral students, GSEFM 
faculty members, the heads of the 
CFS  research  areas  and  policy 
makers. While the papers written 
within  the  Policy  Research  Net-
work  will  likely  have  significant 
impact well beyond the confines of 
academia, in line with the focus of GSEFM, the Policy Research 
Network will give strong weight to placement of the papers in 
refereed journals. Michael Binder, who is Founding Dean of 
GSEFM and has had a long-standing affiliation with CFS, will 
head  the  CFS-GSEFM  Policy  Research  Network.  His  close 
interaction with GSEFM’s doctoral students and his thorough 
understanding  of  the  CFS  network  make  him  an  excellent 
choice for directing this highly promising new initiative.
Michael Binder6
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A first event already took place this 
spring, when Dr. Klaus Düllmann 
from the Deutsche Bundesbank spoke 
to advanced Ph.D. students and faculty 
members  about  possible  research 
initiatives in the field of banking regu-
lation and supervision. The workshop 
was  meant  to  initiate  collaboration 
between the Research Centre at the 
Bundesbank  and  young  researchers 
at the university. The idea is to give students the possibility to 
participate in research projects on topics related to banking 
regulation and the recommendations of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision.
During  the  workshop,  Düllmann  and  his  team  outlined  a 
number  of  “hot”  topics  for  policy  research.  He  presented 
several ongoing regulation initiatives, and outlined for each 
initiative a number of related research topics. The research 
subjects  he  presented  covered  a  range  of  issues,  including 
macro-prudential regulation, liquidity regulation, securitization 
and the originate-to-distribute (OTD) model, crisis solution 
and intervention, as well as improvements to stress tests. 
Having  outlined  the  various  research  topics,  students  were 
invited to speak with Bundesbank staff members present at 
the workshop about the possibility of collaborating on specific 
research projects.
Encouraging Research on Banking Regulation  
and Banking Supervision
CFS-LEMF Summer School
Our  yearly  summer  school  will  also  be  adjusted  to  reflect 
the  new  strategy.  Cooperation  with  other  departments  or 
university entities has now been brought to the forefront and 
the overall emphasis has shifted towards course offerings for 
Ph.D. students and PostDocs. This year’s Summer School will 
be held from 16 till 20 August 2010, and is a joint project 
with the Doctorate/Ph.D. Program on Law and Economics of 
Money and Finance. 
The 2010 Summer School will focus on the legal and economic 
aspects of contracts. The guest speakers will be Scott Baker 
(Professor  of  Law  at Washington  University,  St.  Louis)  and 
Douglas Cumming (Associate Professor in Finance and Entre-
preneurship at the Schulich School of Business, York University, 
Canada). 
A broad range of subjects will be covered. The program has been 
divided into three main areas: 1) Legal Topics; 2) Economic 
Theory; and 3) Financial Contracting. Students will consider, 
for example, how to analyze and interpret contracts, as well as 
the economics behind contracts and contract analysis.
Klaus Düllmann
1
Doctorate / Ph.D. Program
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
MONEY AND FINANCE
Summer School 2010
Law and Economics of Contracts
16August – 20August 2010
1. Legal Topics
x Offer and acceptance
x Consideration
x Damages for breach
x Contract interpretation
x Warranties and allocation of risk
2.Economic Theory
x of contract default and mandatory rules
x of damage; i.e., the incentives created for breach and investment 
      decisions by the various available damage remedies   
x behind the doctrines of impracticability, impossibility, and
      frustration of purpose    
x underlying forward and future contracts
3. Financial Contracting
x The legal and economic aspect of contracts: an overview
x Analytical methods in law – an application to contract law
x Contract law case studies and analysis
x Financial contracting: overview and recent advances
GUEST LECTURERS
Scott Baker
Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, USA
Scott A. Baker is a prolific and widely-respected law and economics scholar. His research tackles a wide range 
of topics, from judicial performance to the structure of law firms to problems in patent law.                         
Before  joining  the  Washington  University  Law  faculty  in  2009,  Baker  was  a 
professor of law at the University of North Carolina since 2002, where he taught 
Law & Economics, Corporate Finance, Contracts, Torts, Property, and Intellectual 
Property.  He  served  as  UNC’s  associate  dean  for  faculty  affairs  from  July  to 
December 2007 and received the McCall Award for Law School Teacher of the Year 
in 2005. He also held a courtesy appointment as professor of economics at UNC.
His research interests lie at the intersection of law, economics, and game theory. 
His  co-authored  work  has  appeared  in  the  Journal  of  Law  and  Economics,  the 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and numerous other law reviews. He is the recipient of a Tilburg 
University grant for studies in the law and economics of innovation.
Baker clerked for Judge E. Grady Jolly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Douglas Cumming
Schulich School of Business, York City, Canada
Douglas Cumming holds the Ontario Research Chair in Economics and Cross Cultural Studies at the Schulich 
School of Business in Toronto. His research areas span topics that include law and finance, public policy, 
entrepreneurial  finance,  venture  capital,  private  equity,  IPOs,  hedge  funds,  and 
exchange regulation and surveillance. He studies applied topics and makes use of a 
wide  range  of  empirical  methods.  Douglas  Cumming’s  work  often  involves 
assessment  of  regulatory  and  other  policy  initiatives  towards  stimulating  market 
activity. 
Prior to joining the Schulich Business School he taught at Rensselaer Polytechnic 
Institute, 2005-2007 and from 2004-2005 was associate Professor of Finance at the 
University  of  New  South  Wales.  He  held  visiting  appointments  inter  alia  at  the 
University of Cambridge and the University of Amsterdam.
The lectures will take place from morning 16 August, 2010 until evening of 20 August, 2010.
The total fee is 400 € and covers lunch as well as reading materials. 
Tuition can be completely or partially waived for students.
For further information please contact:
Claudia Bieber, LL.M. | Managing Director | Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics of Money and Finance (LEMF)
House of Finance | Goethe University Frankfurt | Grüneburgplatz 1 | D-60323 Frankfurt am Main
bieber@hof.uni-frankfurt.de | www.lemf.uni-frankfurt.de | Phone +49 (0)69 798-33778
Office Location
Goethe University Frankfurt
Doctorate / Ph.D. Program Law and 
Economics of Money and Finance
House of Finance | Grüneburgplatz 1
60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
More infos at
www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/lemf/
Program Coordination
Prof. Dr. Brigitte Haar 
+49 (0)69 / 798-33764
Prof. Dr. Uwe Walz
+49 (0)69 / 798-34821
	 	 A brochure can be downloaded from the internet: 
  http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/lemf/images/   
  brochure_summer school 2010.pdf7
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House of Finance Policy Platform
The Policy Platform website gives access to a pool of OpEds 
and working papers written by researchers from the House 
of  Finance,  or  members  of  Goethe  University’s  Faculty  of 
Economics and Business Administration, and Faculty of Law. 
The contributions are published either as Policy Letter or as 
White  Paper. White  Papers  comprise  more  comprehensive 
research-based contributions to current policy debates. Policy 
Letters are short essays or commentaries on current policy 
topics, usually written for publication in the press. 
The objective is threefold, to make in-house generated policy-
relevant research accessible to the general public, to support 
policy makers through ad-hoc advisory teams and policy briefs, 
and to write policy-oriented White Papers on strategic aspects 
of finance and lawmaking.
In  the  first  half  of  2010  the  following  articles  were  made 
available online:
	 Website: www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform
Mit Sparen stützt der Staat die 
Wirtschaft
Volker Wieland 
Handelsblatt – 8 June 2010
Die Mär von der Spekulation
Otmar Issing 
FAZ – 27 May 2010
Den Stabilitätspakt stärken: 
Staatsschulden besteuern
Stefan Gerlach 
Börsen-Zeitung – 14 May 2010
Noch haben wir die Krise nicht gebannt
Stefan Gerlach
Handelsblatt – 4 May 2010
Wie arm oder reich ist Griechenland 
wirklich?
Michael Haliassos
Handelsblatt – 7 May 2010
Warum werden die Banken immer 
verschont?
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Handelsblatt – 7 May 2010
How to be a good European …  
Volker Wieland
www.oekonomenstimme.org – 4 May 2010
G20 and Macro-prudential Policy
Stefan Gerlach
Bruegel | G20 Blog – 22 April 2010
Frühwarn- und Überwachungssystem zur 
Stabilisierung der Finanzmärkte 
Stefan Gerlach
Neue Zürcher Zeitung – 16 April 2010
Germany´s role in the Greek drama (letter 
to the editor) 
Stefan Gerlach
Financial Times  – 12 April 2010
Anheben des Inflationsziels wäre 
verheerend 
Stefan Gerlach
Börsen-Zeitung – 1 April 2010
Höhere Löhne sind keine Lösung  
Otmar Issing
Financial Times Deutschland – 22 March 2010
Zur Stärkung der Deutschen Bundesbank  
Stefan Gerlach, Emilie Yoo
Ökonomenstimme – 22 March 2010
Die Konsolidierung im Inneren muss 
Vorrang haben
Helmut Siekmann
Börsen-Zeitung – 12 March 2010
Ein staatliches Hospital für kranke Banken 
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Rescue Strategy without Moral Hazard
This article summarizes the concept for crisis prevention and intervention, outlined in the White Paper by 
J. P. Krahnen and H. Siekmann “Rettungsstrategie ohne Moral Hazard – Versuch eines Gesamtkonzepts zur 
Bankkrisenvermeidung“. The paper was a draft for talks at the Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt) that 
took place in Berlin in February 2010. The complete German version can be downloaded from the Policy 
Platform website. A revised English version of the paper is scheduled to appear soon.
The financial crisis caught many unaware. 
Although a major collapse of the banking 
system could be prevented, the measures 
taken at the time are now generally con-
sidered to be unsuitable for the future. 
The  main  objection  is  the  enormous 
incentive  for  moral  hazard,  associated 
with state-financed rescue measures. 
One of the most common insights gained 
in this crisis has been that systemic risks 
in the highly interlinked financial system 
represent  a  real  threat. The  danger  of 
systemic risk and worldwide contagion 
must be faced, without at the same time 
creating  negative  incentives  “ex  ante”. 
This  suggests  that  a  balanced  set  of 
instruments must be at hand with which 
banks may be rescued or wound down in 
an orderly fashion.
Making  a  distinction  between  acute 
and  preventive  rescue  measures  (crisis 
intervention  and  crisis  prevention)  is 
crucial. Furthermore, a distinction must 
be  made  between  the  problems  of  an 
individual bank and those of the financial 
system as a whole. Four cases or fields 
for  regulation  arise  from  making  this 
distinction:
Single Banks and  
Crisis Prevention
It can undoubtedly be said that the system 
of banking supervision aimed at prevent-
ing a crisis within the financial system has 
not fulfilled its intended purpose. This is 
true with respect to both the supervisory 
institutions as well as the recommenda-
tions of the Basel Committee. 
The  implications  of  systemic  risk  and 
the  eventuality  of  contagion  between 
banks have hitherto received little or no 
attention. An important issue is the pro-
tection of individual institutions against 
a bank run, since it reduces the risk of 
contagion for other financial institutions 
and  contributes  to  the  stability  of  the 
system as a whole. 
In Germany there exists in this context 
a  considerable  need  for  reform.  The 
guarantee  scheme  for  claims  against 
banks is divided according to the pillar 
structure of the German banking system. 
These claims are thus walled off from one 
another, which reduces the efficiency of 
the system. Furthermore, the voluntary 
guarantee schemes that exceed the legally 
prescribed  minimum  insurance  do  not
constitute a legal obligation and are not 
sufficiently covered by capital. The funding 
obligations are at least in the case of the 
deposit guarantee funds of the Association 
of  German  Banks  (Bundesverband 
deutscher Banken) too low. Furthermore, 
reciprocal insurance can only work in the 
case of isolated banking problems. In any 
event an additional state deposit guarantee 
fund  will  be  required  and  it  might  be 
advisable to emulate the American Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation that acts as 
regulator and in the U.S. is perceived to be 
the most efficient supervisory institution.
Single Institutions and  
Crisis Intervention
 
Crisis prevention can only be successful 
when  it  is  not  counteracted  by  the 
expectations  of  market  participants 
about  the  behavior  of  regulators  and 
central  banks  in  the  event  of  a  crisis 
(crisis intervention). The expectation has 
now arisen that, in an emergency, banks 
will be unconditionally supported using 
taxpayers’ money and that creditors will 
be safeguarded from any financial losses. 
These expectations must now be credibly 
countermanded.  A  legally  binding 
mechanism must be introduced by which 
shareholders and creditors participate in 
the burden of a bank collapse. 
The existing insolvency proceedings have 
proved to be unsuitable. This deficiency 
should  be  remedied  by  creating  an 
institutionalized restructuring process for 
failing banks. A so-called “bank hospital”  Key: ESF = deposit guarantee funds · CoCo = contingent convertible bonds · ESRB = European Systemic Risk Board
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will be required, a state-run institution 
endowed with the power to enforce the 
necessary  procedures,  even  in  the  face 
of  opposition  from  creditors  and  bank 
owners. In the event of a sudden crisis, 
the failing financial institution could be 
safeguarded from insolvency and then be 
restructured without haste. Parts of the 
business could be sold off or liquidated. 
Finally,  the  accounts  could  be  settled 
and the remaining losses charged to the 
shareholders and creditors. In this way the 
principle of privatizing profits and losses 
could be enforced and the incentives for 
excessive risk-taking could be effectively 
curtailed. 
It would be appropriate not to focus on 
the institution in its entirety but rather 
on the individual contracts that the bank 
has  entered.  A  financial  institution’s 
commitments  could  then  be  classified 
as  being  either  systemically  relevant  or 
systemically non-relevant. This evaluation 
of debt would be the task of the state that 
underwrites the guarantees. In this way the 
systemically relevant parts of the company 
can  be  safeguarded  without  eliminating 
the insolvency risk for the remainder. The 
risk of default on non-systemic debt must 
remain solely with the creditors. Through 
the  appropriate  regulations  it  must  be 
ensured that all institutions at all times 
have sufficient non-systemic outstanding 
liabilities  at  their  disposal.  In  this  way 
an institution should be prevented from 
evading its immediate responsibilities by 
claiming that all its debt is “systemic”. 
The Banking System and Crisis 
Prevention
It  is  not  always  easy  to  differentiate 
between the crisis of a single institution 
and that of several institutions, or indeed 
of the system as a whole. The Lehman 
bankruptcy  showed  that  the  linkage 
between  financial  institutions  and  their 
common  dependency  on  the  market 
evaluation  of  individual  assets  can  have 
fatal  results  for  other  institutions.  If  a 
systemic  crisis  threatens  to  become  a 
simultaneous collapse of several important 
institutions, then there is no alternative to 
coordinated  state  intervention.  In  this 
case it makes no difference whether the 
cause is a run on the banks by depositors 
or the mutual loss of confidence between 
the banks themselves. 
In fact the accumulation of systemic risk 
is  generally  not  directly  perceived  by 
the  individual  financial  institution,  nor 
is  it  apparent  in  its  balance  sheet. The 
incurrence of systemic risk is in economic 
terms an externality and it needs to be 
internalized in order for it to appear in 
the operational costs and in the calculation 
of return. In the first place a compulsory 
duty may be envisaged, which could be 
in  the  form  of  a  compensation  charge. 
This  type  of  charge  is  quite  common 
in  environmental  policy  aimed  at 
minimizing negative (polluting) behavior 
or  at  offsetting  specific  advantages  or 
disadvantages. The  level  of  the  charge 
should be set according to the degree by 
which the asset in question contributes 
to  the  overall  systemic  risk. This  type 
of  charge  would  ensure  that  systemic 
risks are made sufficiently “expensive” for 
individual institutions. 
Nevertheless,  determining  the  systemic 
risks of individual banks or debts can give 
rise  to  considerable  practical  problems. 
Almost  no  one  saw  in  the  top  rated 
securities held by some banks the trigger 
for  a  global  crisis.  In  this  context,  we 
should  remember  the  notion  already 
proposed by the German government at 
the G20 meetings of a risk map, capturing 
the  bilateral  financial  relationships 
between  big,  internationally  active 
financial institutions. It is a prerequisite 
for even being able to calculate the charges 
outlined above. 
Assuming  that  it  is  indeed  possible  to 
levy  such  a  charge,  the  question  still 
remains what should then happen to the 
money.  There  are  several  arguments 
in  support  of  a  reinvestment  of  the 
proceeds in the encumbered institutions 
in  the  form  of  contingent  convertible 
bonds (CoCo), namely bonds that upon 
demand may be converted into equity. 
The  conversion  takes  place  when  the 
financial  institution  is  deemed  to  be 
solvent but illiquid. Via the conversion 
the institution gains direct access to fresh 
capital and is able to reduce its interest 
payments, thus increasing its operating 
income  and  improving  its  liquidity 
situation. When there is no crisis, such 
bond holdings are risk adequate and bear 
interest  at  the  going  market  rate. The 
decision for conversion should lie with 
the supervisory authorities.
The Banking System and 
Crisis Intervention: the Role 
of the Regulator
Combating a crisis of the entire banking 
system will again be a case for the bank 
hospital. The measures adopted will differ, 
since the so called CoCo accumulated in 
times of no crisis can be completely or 
partially converted into equity. Following 
the  conversion  the  obligation  to  pay 
interest is immediately dropped (liquidity 
effect)  and  equity  capital  is  increased 
without  having  to  resort  to  the  capital 
market (solvency effect).
For  appropriate  crisis  prevention  and 
intervention, it is imperative to have a 
well  functioning  supervisory  authority. 
There are clear indications that the trend 
towards „self regulation“ in the financial 
sector  in  lieu  of  a  strong  supervision 
contributed  significantly  to  the  crisis. 
Measures  and  institutions  aimed  at 
securing financial market stability serve 
society as a whole and should therefore 
be largely financed by federal budget. The 
regulatory laws set out in the Banking 
Act  and  its  implementing  regulations 
require a thorough revision.10
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Too Much Money is Dangerous
“Inflation  is  always  and  everywhere  a 
monetary phenomenon” is a well-known 
statement  by  Milton  Friedman.  Since 
the crisis, billions of cheap money are 
available  in  the  market.  Many  articles 
recently titled “Keynes is back”. Indeed, 
a  Keynesian  spirit  reigns  around  the 
globe.  The  Keynesian  policy  however 
implies  huge  public  deficits  and  new 
financial bubbles. Does a renaissance of 
monetarism seem set?
The recent Keynesian renaissance is not 
surprising. The crisis that started in 2007 
can only be compared in history with the 
Great  Depression  after  1929.  Keynes’ 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money written in 1936 meant at that time 
a  turning  point  towards  an  economic 
policy  that  tried  to  steer  employment 
from the demand side. This perception 
was long present in Anglo-Saxon policy 
but also in academic discussions.
The dominance of Keynesianism began 
to dwindle following two developments. 
The first was the theoretical and empiri-
cal  work  mostly  connected  to  Milton 
Friedman.  The  so-called  monetarists 
challenged fundamental elements of the 
Keynesian theory and its application in 
economic  policy. The  second  develop-
ment  was  a  failure  of  the  Keynesian 
policy  when  government  spending  led 
to  high  inflation  without  in  the  end 
reducing  unemployment.  Monetarism 
offered an explanation for the failure of 
the Keynesian policy and central banks 
started to integrate the new ideas in their 
policies. The Bundesbank, for example, 
was the first central bank to introduce a 
money supply target in 1975. 
Long before the outbreak of the current 
financial crisis, monetarism was already 
on the retreat. Numerous financial inno-
vations, for example, were more or less 
affecting  the  significance  of  monetary 
aggregates and the control of the money 
supply was neglected or even ignored by 
most central banks. Since the mid 90s, 
direct  inflation  targeting  became  the 
dominant strategy and academic discus-
sions reflected these findings. 
Is  monetarism  dead?  Although  many 
recent developments might point in that 
direction, one should not ignore some of 
the key points of criticism that monetar-
ism has brought forward.
If central banks ignore the time lag in 
the effect of monetary policy measures, 
which could be one to two years, there 
is a danger that the inflationary dynamics 
are being underestimated. This in return 
could  lead  to  a  delayed  exit  from  the 
expansionary  policy.  Is  it  possible  that 
the high days of Keynesianism are already 
over  again? There  is  more  and  more 
evidence that the government spending
multiplier effect is over-rated and that 
there is a changing attitude towards the 
huge government deficits.
The  widespread  Keynesian  belief  that 
money  doesn’t  matter  has  proven  to  be 
wrong.  The  inflation  of  asset  prices 
worldwide would not have been possible 
without the immense expansion of the 
money supply and the credit volume. 
Monetarism  will  not  return  to  its  old 
recipes. The models to explain monetary 
development  will  not  rely  on  simple 
money supply concepts. Credit volume 
in all its facets will play a more central 
role. The European Central Bank with 
its  two  pillar  strategy  and  its  refined 
monetary analysis will be well-armed to 
face future challenges. Let’s only hope 
that the world doesn’t have to endure a 
new phase of inflation in order to value 
Milton Friedman’s words.
	 	 This article summarizes a contribution by Otmar Issing that was 
published in Die Zeit on 5 March 2010 under the title “Zu viel Geld ist 
gefährlich”.  The online version can be found on: 
  www.zeit.de/2010/10/F-Monetarismus. An article on this topic is also  
  forthcoming in „The International Economy“ (Spring 2010 Edition).11
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In this article, Otmar Issing argues that 
the “Greek debacle” is a striking example 
of  bending  the  truth,  in  that  financial 
speculation  is  blamed  for  the  recent 
developments  in  Europe.  Speculation 
supposedly brought Greece to the brink 
of national bankruptcy, and then drove 
the euro down. According to Issing, this 
is a myth which tries to conceal the root 
causes of the crisis by shifting the focus 
of  attention  to  speculation  –  one  that 
could  cause  some  serious  damage  by 
opening the doors for the wrong policy 
responses.
Is “speculation” really at play when pension 
funds and investors turn their backs on 
Greek government bonds in the face of 
Greece’s clearly failing national economic 
policy? Having said this, the reasons for 
the current difficulties in Europe are not 
just to be found in the budgetary problems 
of  Greece.  All  eurozone  governments 
bear part of the responsibility, given the 
previous tolerance of irresponsible fiscal 
behavior.
Proposals for reforming the Stability and 
Growth Pact, for improving the system 
of supervision and for sanctions are now 
on the table. Every effort should be made 
to  find  credible  solutions,  so  that  the 
mistakes of the past are not repeated.
Die Mär von der 
Spekulation 
Otmar Issing, F.A.Z. – 27 May 2010
The  47th  edition  of  our  publication 
series “Beiträge zum CFS Colloquium” is 
devoted to the colloquium lectures that 
took place between February 2008 and 
April 2009. This period of time, directly 
after the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
was marked by a number of foreboding 
events.  Months  of  financial  trouble  and 
the collapse of several institutions, such 
as  Bear  Stearns,  Northern  Rock  and 
IKB,  climaxed  with  the  bankruptcy  of 
Lehman  Brothers.  It  was  a  period  of 
great  distress  and  far-reaching  distrust 
within financial markets. The lectures that 
took place during this turbulent period 
reflect the insights of leading personalities 
in  the  German  financial  industry.  Peer 
Steinbrück  (German  Federal  Minister 
of  Finance  from  2005  to  2009),  Josef 
Ackermann  (Chairman  of  Deutsche 
Bank),  Siegfried  Jaschinski  (then  head 
of Landesbank Baden-Württemberg) and 
Johannes Huth (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts 
& Co.) all gave their views on our financial 
system against the backdrop of the crisis. 
Steinbrück  laid  out  the  fundamental 
principles  behind  German  state 
intervention  at  the  beginning  of  2008. 
At that time, the focus was on keeping 
financial  markets  operational,  providing 
liquidity  and  ensuring  the  solvency  of 
certain banks. Looking back, it becomes 
clear that, at that stage, macro-prudential 
supervision and international coordination 
were not yet issues of concern. Ackermann 
spoke  about  the  underlying  business 
strategy of Deutsche Bank, which is one 
of  complementing  a  global  orientation 
with a strong domestic base. This strategy 
proved  to  be  successful,  particularly  in 
the time of crisis, when many institutions 
were  in  need  of 
support. Johannes Huth 
highlighted  the  role  of 
private  equity  firms 
during  the  financial 
turmoil. They were able to demonstrate 
their  crisis  management  capabilities 
and  were  forced  to  take  a  long-term 
perspective  on  corporate  development. 
Siegfried Jaschinski shared his views on the 
future role of the German Landesbanken.
We are convinced that this volume will 
be a valuable source of information and 
point of discussion for analysts as well as 
commentators with a keen interest in the 
German financial system. It contributes 
to  a  better  understanding  of  how  the 
positions of varying agents evolved during 
the crisis.
CFS Publications
Beiträge zum CFS Colloquium – Volume 47
Finanzinstitutionen: Neue Produkte – Neue Strategien?
Financial Services Providers: New Products – New Strategies?
Peer Steinbrück    Finanzplatz Deutschland: Wachstum oder Krise? 
Dr. Josef Ackermann   Strategieentwicklung im Spannungsfeld globaler und nationaler Orientierung 
Dr. Siegfried Jaschinski   Zwischen privatem Wettbewerb und öffentlicher Trägerschaft: 
      Strategie der Landesbanken heute 
Johannes P. Huth   Entwicklungsperspektiven für das Private-Equity-Geschäft in Europa
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Modern macroeconomics has come under severe public criti-
cism for failing to deliver a warning ahead of the global financial 
crisis and offering sufficient policy prescriptions for fighting 
the crisis. In particular, critics have pointed to an excessive 
reliance in macroeconomic modeling on the dominating para-
digm of rational decision-making by representative households 
and firms. Research on revising popular models is now well 
under way. To analyze and compare the usefulness of state-of-
art  tools,  traditional  modeling  approaches  and  forthcoming 
innovations a new approach is necessary. The Macroeconomic 
Model  Data  Base  project  provides  such  a  new  comparative 
approach  to  model-based  research  and  policy  analysis,  that 
enables individual researchers to conduct model comparisons 
easily, frequently, at low cost and on a large scale.
The Macroeconomic Model Data Base
A New Comparative Approach to Macroeconomic Modeling 
and Policy Analysis
This book presents important aspects of 
the  New-Keynesian  theory  of  monetary 
policy and its implications for the practical 
decision-making of central bankers today. 
Bridging  the  theory  and  practice  of 
monetary policy, it provides an exposition 
on  the  key  elements  of  the  New-
Keynesian approach, outlines important 
lessons for policymakers, and points to 
new  directions  for  further  research. 
Important  policy  implications  of  the 
New-Keynesian approach such as the 
case for forecast targeting as a strategy 
for monetary policy, the combination 
of  model-based  forecasts  with 
cyclical  analysis,  and  strategies  for 
cross-checking model-based policy 
recommendations are presented in 
detail. The  book  brings  together 
new  contributions  from  leading 
scientists  and  experienced  policymakers 
presented at an academic symposium on the 
occasion of the awarding of the Deutsche 
Bank Prize in Financial Economics 2007 to 
Professor Michael Woodford.
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In order to make this approach operational a model archive 
is built that includes many well-known empirically estimated 
macroeconomic models which may be used for quantitative 
analysis of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies.
Today, academics and researchers at central banks, treasuries 
and  international  organizations  are  confronted  with  a  wide 
range  of  macroeconomic  models  that  aim  to  explain  the 
behavior  of  the  main  aggregates  of  the  world’s  economies. 
Not surprisingly, those models differ in terms of economic 
structure, estimation methodology and parameter estimates.
 
Hence, the effects of a policy measure may vary depending on 
which particular model is used for its evaluation. In fact, the 
results  of  policy  evaluations  sometimes  differ  tremendously 
for alternative models, a particular policy measure can appear 
highly desirable in one model but lead to poor results in a 
competing model. This makes the systematic comparison of the 
empirical implications of the set of available models as well as 
the evaluation of the performance of different policies across 
many models highly relevant. Yet, in the past such projects 
have been infrequent and costly. Earlier comparison projects 
involved multiple teams of researchers, each team working 
only with one or a small subset of available models, thereby 
complicating the consistent comparison of alternative models’ 
characteristics and policy implications. 
The Macroeconomic Model Data Base project develops a new 
approach  that  involves  several  documented  steps  in  order 
to  make  models  consisting  of  different  variables,  distinct 
structural assumptions and alternative notation comparable to 
each other and useful for policy analysis. In particular, these 
steps involve the augmentation of the models with a set of 
common variables, parameters, shocks and equations. A formal 
exposition is given in Wieland et al. (2009). 
The approach has been used to create a computational platform 
written in MATLAB and employing the DYNARE software 
package that includes by now about 30 augmented models, 
representing  a  wide  range  of  alternative  modeling  assump-
tions and paradigms. A user interface allows one to engage 
in straightforward comparison of models’ characteristics and 
implications of alternative policies such as different monetary 
policy rules. New models can easily be included and evaluated 
against the existing benchmarks.
Some illustrative examples of the Modelbase software together 
with the detailed documentation of the comparative approach 
can be found in Wieland et al. (2009) and a first version of the 
software is available for testing at:
www.macromodelbase.com. 
We expect that the combination of a comparative approach and 
the provision of an accessible model archive should improve the 
replicability of quantitative macroeconomic analysis and should 
strengthen the robustness of policy recommendations.
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CFS Financial Center Index Remains Unchanged 
Special Survey on a Bank Levy
With  a  value  of  108.0  points,  the 
overall CFS Financial Center Index has 
effectively  remained  unchanged  from 
its  January  level  (108.6).  Looking  at 
the  different  business  parameters  of 
the index (transaction volume, profits, 
employment,  and  investments),  it 
becomes clear that the current business 
climate  is  not  all  that  consistent.  On 
the one hand, participants expressed a 
positive view on return and investments 
but, on the other, showed more restraint 
concerning revenues and employment. 
There  are  also  significant  disparities 
between the four branch-specific groups 
that  are  being  surveyed  (financial 
institutions  and  brokerage  firms, 
financial  sector  service  providers, 
supervisory  and  academic  institutions, 
and  connected  enterprises).  Financial 
institutions  and  brokerage  firms,  for 
example, reported a considerable rise in 
profits (+11.1 points), thus surpassing 
the  expectations  recorded  in  the  last 
survey.  However,  their  employment 
forecasts for the upcoming quarter show 
a decrease of 9.0 points. “This modest 
view with respect to employment figures 
shows  that  last  quarter’s  job  market 
expectations  have  not  been  fulfilled. 
It  proves  that  the  financial  sector  is 
continuing to employ cost discipline, as 
the sustainability of economic growth is 
still being questioned,” says CFS Director, 
Jan Pieter Krahnen.
For  the  first  time,  the  overall  index 
is  presented  together  with  two  sub-
indices, namely those for “performance” 
(evaluating  the  past  quarter)  and  for 
“projection”  (forecasting  the  upcoming 
quarter) in a line-shaped diagram (see 
Figure 1). The diagram also shows that, in 
the past year, the projection sub-index was 
consistently higher than the performance 
sub-index,  while  both  sub-indices  are 
now  converging  around  the  overall 
index. It appears, however, that in the fall 
of 2008, following the Lehman disaster, 
performance  exceeded  projections.   
Special Survey: 
Private and Public Sector at 
Odds over a Bank Levy
The  special  survey  that  was  held  this 
spring focused on what participants think 
about  a  possible  levy  on  the  financial 
sector. Respondents were equally divided 
as to whether they are in favor of a bank 
levy or against it, albeit with there being 
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ
1,
Ê£ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
-Ê>V>Ê
iÌiÀÊ`iÝ
ÛiÀ>
«ÀiVÌ
«iÀvÀ>Vi
`>Ìi


`
i
Ý
Ê
Û
>

Õ
i
£Îä
£Óx
£Óä
££x
££ä
£äx
£ää
x
ä
>ÓääÇ
>«ÀÓääÇ
ÕÓääÇ
VÌÓääÇ
>Óään
>«ÀÓään
ÕÓään
VÌÓään
>Óää
>«ÀÓää
ÕÓää
VÌÓää
>Óä£ä
>«ÀÓä£ä
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ
>ÛiÀ>}i Ü }
ÃÞÃÌiVÊÀÃ

i
`

>

Ê
L
«
Ê
­
L
>
Ã
i
«



Ì
Ã
Ê

v
Ê
Ì

Ì
>

Ê
>
Ã
Ã
i
Ì
Ã
L






Ê
«
i
À
Ê
Þ
i
>
À
1,
ÊÓÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ,iµÕÀiiÌÃÊvÊ	>ÊiÛÞ
ÛiÀ>
«ÀÛ>ÌiÊÃiVÌÀ «ÕLVÊÃiVÌÀ
L>Ã
Ç°x
È°Çx
È°ä
x°Óx
{°x
Î°Çx
Î°ä
Ó°Óx
£°x
ä°Çx
ä°ä
£ä

n
Ç
È
x
{
Î
Ó
£
ä15
CFS Financial Center Index | Research and Policy
a clear discrepancy between the opinion 
of respondents from private banks and 
those from their public and cooperative 
sector  counterparts. While  a  relatively 
high  percentage  of  respondents  from 
private  banks  (40%)  are  in  favor  of  a 
bank  tax,  50%  of  those  from  public 
banks oppose this idea. 
All respondents, however, largely agreed 
that any levy should flow into an external 
fund that is clearly separate from the state 
budget.  27%  of  respondents  consider 
the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  as  the  most 
appropriate  institution  for  setting  the 
annual amount of this tax, while 21% 
would  prefer  the  European  Systemic 
Risk Board to be in charge once measures 
are  introduced  across  Europe.  The 
majority of banks (52%) support a levy 
for  all  financial  institutions,  including 
insurance companies and other financial 
institutions, such as hedge funds, private 
equity firms, etc. Insurance companies, 
for  their  part,  favor  a  solution  that 
involves only banks.
With respect to an actual figure for the 
size of the tax, the survey reveals that 
1 basis point or 0.01% of the balance 
sheet  is  considered  an  appropriate 
level when systemic risk is low. For an 
average to high systemic risk, the survey 
finds that this level should be increased 
threefold and fivefold respectively. For 
comparison,  the  German  government 
proposed introducing an annual tax on 
banks worth a total € 1.18 billion. Given 
that  the  German  banking  system  has 
an aggregate balance sheet of € 7,500 
billion (Deutsche Bundesbank, February 
2010), this would imply a rate of 1.6 
basis points or 0.016 % of the balance 
sheet.
Having said this, there is a clear difference 
of opinion between groups of respondents 
regarding the progressiveness of such a 
levy (see Figure 2). Those from public 
and cooperative banks, in particular, are 
in favor of high levies in the case of high 
systemic risk.
Tobin Tax
The  survey  also  shows  that  there  is 
considerable  opposition  to  another 
regulatory  measure  now  being 
considered, namely the so-called “Tobin 
tax”. A clear majority of all respondents 
(65%)  are  against  a  tax  on  financial 
transactions.  “Despite  a  great  deal  of 
skepticism among private banks about a 
bank levy, it is still regarded as a more 
appropriate regulatory instrument than 
a tax on financial transactions,” explains 
Krahnen.
The CFS Financial Center Index is part of the “Financial 
Center  Monitoring”  project,  which  aims  to  measure 
the competitiveness of Germany as a financial center 
in the European context. The index is presently based 
on a quarterly survey of management at 400 enterprises 
in  Germany.  The  survey  panel  consists  of  financial 
industry enterprises and institutions, as well as selected 
companies  that  profit  from  the  financial  sector. The 
survey contains four questions related to participants’ 
views on different business parameters (i.e. transaction 
volume,  profits,  employment,  and  investment  in 
product  and  process  innovations).  Participants  are 
asked to reply whether they are “positive”, “neutral” or 
“negative” for both the previous and current quarter. 
The index is compiled from different sub-indices, as all 
participants  are  allocated  to  branch-specific  groups. 
Within each group, a balance of the share of positive 
and negative responses is evaluated and transformed 
into  performance  data. These  performance  data  are 
then aggregated in order to construct the final index. 
Under this process the maximum index value is 150; the 
minimum index value is 50; and a value of 100 signals 
that business sentiment is neutral.
CFS project team: Florian Hense and Christian Knoll16
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Mehr Stabilität für die globalen Finanzmärkte –  
die Sicht der Banken
Towards a More Robust Global Financial System – 
the Perspective of Banks 
17 March 2010 
Josef Ackermann
CFS Colloquium
On March 17, CFS welcomed Josef Ackermann, Chairman of the Management Board and the Group Executive 
Committee of Deutsche Bank AG, as a guest speaker at the CFS Colloquium. In his speech, Ackermann discussed 
the role of financial markets and outlined six key measures for a new regulatory framework for the global 
financial system.
A Clear Focus 
Required
Ackermann  observed  that  the  current  debate  on  the 
reorganization of the financial system following the crisis is 
marked by a dichotomy. On the one hand, financial experts 
are involved in a complex technical debate on the measures 
required for financial market reform. On the other hand, a 
broader public debate on the future role of financial institutions 
and  markets  is  taking  place.  Between  both  sides  there  is  a 
large gap: Ackermann said that the technical debate is lacking 
a  general  orientation,  while  the  public  debate  is  missing  a 
technical fundament about the importance of financial markets 
and  the  effects  of  market  regulation.  Both  debates  should 
be reconciled in order to find a clear orientation and focus. 
Ackermann  proposed  that  the  following  three  questions  be 
considered: 1) what role do financial markets play in a modern 
economy;  2)  what  type  of  financial  markets  and  financial 
products do we want to have; and 3) how can we find the 
appropriate  regulatory  framework  for  this  without  creating 
unwanted financial instability?
The Role of 
the Financial System
As  regards  the  role  of  the  financial  industry,  Ackermann 
pointed out that its first duty is to provide financial services 
for the real economy. But in addition, financial markets have 
an autonomous role in adding economic value by providing 
liquidity  and  increasing  the  information  content  of  prices. 
According to Ackermann, high quality pricing signals represent 
the most important contribution of modern financial systems, as 
these provide the basis for investment decisions for individuals, 
institutions and political decision makers. However, Ackermann 
Josef Ackermann17
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also noted that the results of market processes are not always 
without failings and therefore have to be assessed carefully. He 
emphasized that the dynamic character of financial markets 
is the outcome of a liberal economic order, which values the 
importance of market prices, thereby valuing the decisions and 
preferences of a large number of autonomous agents. 
What Type of 
Financial Markets?
It is not sufficient just to agree on the role that the financial 
system should play. It also needs to be clarified what kind of 
financial markets we want to have in order to ensure that the 
system  can  play  its  role. Ackermann  sees  two  problematic 
schools of thought that have recently emerged. The first involves 
a drive to return to supposedly safe local financial markets with 
far-reaching powers (de jure and de facto) of intervention for 
national regulators. The second, as proposed i.a. by Paul   Volcker, 
calls for a simpler and more transparent banking system; one 
that concentrates on traditional banking activities (that would 
be eligible for state help in case of emergency) and which does 
not engage in riskier activities, such as derivatives or private 
equity and hedge fund investments. According to Ackermann, 
both  are  problematic,  as  the  abandonment  of  integrated 
international financial markets would imply a breach with the 
traditional,  internationally-minded  orientations  of  economic 
policy in the West and would result in a major welfare loss. 
No modern economy could afford to restrict the broad range 
of  financial  instruments  presently  available  without  facing 
negative welfare effects. He gave several examples, including 
the  importance  of  currency  and  commodity  derivatives  for 
industry,  and  the  role  of  emission  certificates  and  weather 
derivatives in managing the costs of climate change. Derivatives 
and hedging instruments are an essential component of our 
economy. Using credit default swaps as an example, he said 
that these instruments provide important price signals to the 
market and allow for an allocation of credit risks that would 
otherwise be difficult to achieve. 
However,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  regulatory  framework 
needs to be reworked, taking the causes and consequences of 
this financial crisis into careful consideration.
Ackermann emphasized that risk management, which proved 
to  be  widely  inadequate  before  and  during  the  crisis,  falls 
primarily within the area of responsibility of banks. Some banks 
as well as other financial institutions bore risks that strongly 
exceeded their risk bearing capacity. Ackermann acknowledged 
that the incentives for certain financial products, as well as 
for the internal allocation of capital, had in many cases been 
inadequate. However, banks alone were not the only source of 
the problem. On the macro side, loose monetary policy and 
the toleration of global imbalances also helped to precipitate 
the financial crisis. Ackermann identified regulatory weakness 
and inappropriate accounting standards as further causes of the 
crisis. Given that a large number of factors have contributed to 
the emergence and intensity of the financial crisis, Ackermann 
concluded,  it  was  necessary  to  employ  a  multi-pronged 
approach in order to make the financial system more resilient.
Key Measures for a 
Robust Financial System
Ackermann  presented  six  key  measures  that  could  provide 
the  basis  for  a  more  resilient  financial  system.  First,  he 
emphasized the importance of macro-prudential supervision 
as  a  complement  to  the  supervision  of  individual  financial 
institutions. In Europe, much progress has already been made 
here,  as  evidenced  by  the  plans  for  a  European  Systemic 
Risk Board. In order to successfully implement systemic risk 
supervision, it was necessary to have: 1) a close collaboration 
between macro- and micro-prudential supervisory authorities; 
2) a comprehensive and global coordination of macro-prudential 
activities; and 3) a broad concept of the systemic risk factors 
that need to be analyzed.
As a second measure, Ackermann called for a careful reform 
of  capital  adequacy  requirements.  The  crisis  has  made  it 
clear  that  the  equity  base  of  the  financial  system  has  been 
insufficient. Consequently, the Basel Committee has proposed 
reform measures in support of a stronger and higher quality 
equity base for banks. For Ackermann, however, some of these 
proposals, such as the Leverage Ratio, are conceptually weak. 
Although rules for higher equity capital are in principle correct, 
they need to be introduced gradually and with a reasonable 1
Events | CFS Colloquium
transition  period,  Ackermann  said,  as  otherwise  a  severe 
deflationary effect could be exerted on the real economy. 
Third, Ackermann pointed out that the liquidity management 
of  financial  institutions  needs  to  be  improved.  In  the  past, 
liquidity of financial markets was basically taken for granted, 
leading to substantial losses during the course of the crisis. The 
Basel Committee recently made some new proposals in this 
respect as well. Ackermann emphasized the importance of an 
international approach to the supervision of liquidity risk, as 
many multinational financial institutions manage their liquidity 
at a group level. 
Fourth, Ackermann called for a robust market infrastructure 
that  allows  for  a  reduction  in  the  complexity  of  financial 
interrelations. One of the main goals here should be to prevent 
“sick” banks from “infecting” healthy competitors by isolating 
them in a way that avoids systemic failure. As an example of a 
well-functioning system, he mentioned the so-called “CCPs” 
(Central Counterparties) used for clearing derivatives. It needs 
to be considered, though, that such systems lead to a greater 
standardization  of  contracts,  which  can  itself  lead  to  less 
flexibility and/or smaller margins for banks.
As a fifth measure, Ackermann suggested to install an effective 
and  well-defined  crisis  management  system.  Such  a  system 
should  address  many  issues,  including  the  rights  and  rules 
for (early) intervention by supervisory authorities, so-called 
“contingent capital arrangements” for raising capital in times 
of financial distress, a streamlined organizational structure for 
financial institutions, a stability fund for banks in distress, and 
a well-functioning insolvency regime for the banking sector as 
a whole. Ackermann pointed out that such a crisis management 
system would effectively decrease uncertainty in times of crisis 
and enhance the resilience of the financial system. 
As  a  last  measure,  Ackermann  called  for  a  well-equipped 
supervisory system with access to adequate resources, including 
highly competent staff. He also underlined the need for more 
consolidated  supranational  supervision,  as  well  as  a  close 
collaboration between national authorities.
David Nicolaus (CFS)
2011
In 2011, the Center for Financial Studies (CFS) and Goethe 
University Frankfurt will present the Deutsche Bank Prize 
in Financial Economics for the fourth time. This prestigious 
academic  prize  will  be  awarded  to  an  internationally 
renowned  researcher,  in  recognition  of  an  outstanding 
achievement in the field of financial economic research.
Starting in October this year, 3,800 academics from over 
55 countries whose research focuses on this field of exper-
tise, will be called upon to take part in the nomination 
procedure until the beginning of December 2010. 
A Jury of international financial experts decides on the 
recipient of the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Eco-
nomics. The  members  of  the  Jury  for  2011  are:  Luigi 
Guiso (European University Institute), Michael Haliassos 
(Goethe University and CFS), Charles Yuji Horioka (Osaka 
University),  Otmar  Issing  (CFS  President),  Jan  Pieter 
Krahnen (Goethe University and CFS), Raimond Maurer 
(Goethe  University),  Thomas  Mayer  (Deutsche  Bank 
Group), Carmen M. Reinhart (University of Maryland), 
Robert J. Shiller (DB Prize award winner 2009 and Yale 
University) and Uwe Walz (Goethe University and CFS).
The winner of the award, which carries an endowment 
of € 50,000, will be announced in February 2011. 
The award itself will be presented by Josef Ackermann, 
the Chairman of the Management Board and the Group 
Executive Committee of Deutsche Bank AG at an award 
ceremony  in  Frankfurt  on  22  September  2011. 
During the course of the award ceremony, a scientific CFS 
Symposium will be held at Campus Westend that will focus 
on the research subject of the prize winner.
    Sabine Kimmel (CFS) 
    Contact: kimmel@ifk-cfs.de
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Ruding began his speech by pointing out the necessity of financial 
reform in Europe; not only in order to reduce the likelihood 
of another crisis, but also to reinforce the EU internal market. 
The primary goal should be to achieve a truly single European 
market for financial services. However, we are still far removed 
from this goal and financial policy is currently facing a trilemma 
in that it is trying to achieve concurrently three non-consistent 
policy goals – financial integration, financial system stability, 
and national regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
– and this imposes a great amount of tension. For this reason, 
Ruding finds it unavoidable that Europe will shift from national 
regimes for banking supervision towards a system of decision 
making at the EU level. 
Europe  is  currently  confronted  with  almost  simultaneous 
banking and sovereign debt crises. It is incorrect to believe 
that the causes for both are the same. While banks can largely 
be  blamed  for  the  first  crisis,  it  is  governments  and  their 
macroeconomic  policies  that  are  responsible  for  the  latter. 
However, both types of crisis mutually reinforce each other and 
historically have very often followed each other. The reverse 
of a banking crisis after a sovereign crisis has also proved to 
occur in the past (e.g. during the Latin American crisis of the 
1980s).
Priorities for Banking Reform
In order to prevent a recurrence of the recent financial crisis, 
Ruding put forward four areas in which reform is needed and 
where it is indispensable.
First,  the  capital  and  liquidity  base  of  financial  institutions 
needs to be strengthened in order to create a stronger buffer 
against failure. This should be done by increasing the capital 
ratio, more specifically the ratio of Tier I capital. There is also 
From National to European Regulation
Towards European Financial Supervisory Authorities 
19 May 2010 
Onno Ruding
The next speaker at this year’s colloquium series on “Rebuilding Financial Markets” was Onno Ruding. He gave 
his views on the financial reforms that are needed in Europe. Given his long-standing international career (see 
box), Ruding has a broad and extensive knowledge of the workings of Europe and its financial markets. He 
presented a very interesting and all-encompassing picture of how regulation and supervision should evolve in 
the coming years.
In 200, Onno Ruding was a member of the High 
Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (de 
Larosière  Group).  He  holds  a  Ph.D.  from  Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam. With a thesis on integrated 
European capital markets, he already showed a keen 
interest in this topic at an early stage of his career.
During the course of his career, Ruding has been: a 
Board Member and Chairman of AMRO; Executive 
Director  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF); the Minister of Finance of The Netherlands; 
and  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Asian  Development  Bank  and  the  Inter-American 
Development Bank.
He became a Director of Citicorp in 1990 and was 
appointed  Vice  Chairman  of  Citicorp/Citibank 
in New York in 1992 and later Vice Chairman and 
Director of Citicorp and Citibank N.A. 
In 2002, he became Chairman of the Board of the 
Centre  for  European  Policy  Studies  (CEPS)  in 
Brussels,  the  largest  independent  think  tank  in 
Europe concerned with European integration.
Onno Ruding20
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a need for higher quality equity capital, and stricter standards 
for what can qualify as capital. In addition, other requirements 
need to be considered, such as higher capital requirements 
for high risk transactions, a new maximum leverage ratio to 
reduce excessive growth, and the inclusion of off-balance sheet 
exposures in the calculation of capital adequacy requirements. 
Indeed, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is pre-
paring a package of proposals to strengthen global capital and 
liquidity regulations, with a view towards making the banking 
sector more resilient at a global level.
The  second  point  of  action  is  an  improvement  in  the  risk 
management of banks. Bank supervisors need to have sufficient 
authority and an effective set of instruments at their disposal 
for realizing the stricter standards for risk management.
Thirdly, a more EU-based system for the regulation and super-
vision of banks needs to be implemented. The proposals of the 
de Larosière Group should be the basis to work from here. The 
final report of this committee comprises proposals for macro-
prudential and micro-prudential supervision and was adopted 
by ECOFIN last year (albeit in substance, but with a regrettable 
weakening as regards certain issues). These proposals are now 
being reviewed by the European Parliament which, Ruding 
hopes, will restore the stricter, original version.
Lastly, Ruding sees the need to agree on priorities beyond the 
de Larosière proposals. One of the next steps would be to work 
out legal provisions for an orderly resolution of ailing banks. 
Currently, authorities have a rather limited choice of options in 
case of a banking crisis. Banks that are in trouble can either be 
bailed out, which is very costly to the taxpayer and leads to the 
so-called “too big to fail” dilemma. In the longer run, this can 
also result in the problem of “moral hazard”, as banks no longer 
have an incentive to restrain their risk behavior. Alternatively, 
troubled banks can default, which would lead to chaos and 
large  losses  for  their  counterparties  and  possible  domino 
effects on other institutions. Therefore, Ruding strongly favors 
setting  up  a  resolution  mechanism  for  banks,  whereby  an 
official resolution authority would be entrusted to step in ex 
ante when ailing banks are still operational and to possibly 
resolve  them  when  necessary.  In  this  case,  the  profitable 
parts of a bank could be sold to interested parties and other 
activities  wound  down  in  an  orderly  manner.  Shareholders 
and subordinated bond holders would be held accountable for 
the resulting losses. This mechanism has the advantage that it 
would be less disruptive than a regular bankruptcy, less costly 
for the taxpayer, and that it solves the problem of moral hazard. 
It would also make the distinction between systemic and non-
systemic banks superfluous. In order for it to be implemented, 
a change in bankruptcy rules would be required.
The Discipline of Market Forces
It  is  widely  agreed  that  irresponsible  risk  management  by 
banks  was  at  the  core  of  the  financial  breakdown  and  that 
financial regulators and supervisors did not react vigorously 
enough  to  contain  the  crisis. Added  to  this,  an  erroneous 
rating system misguided investors. Ruding, however, pointed 
out that financial market participants also contributed to the 
crisis with their own inadequate risk behavior. Many had been 
investing irresponsibly for too long and for too large an amount 
of money. If there had been more financial discipline among 
investors, big losses could have been avoided and the outbreak 
of the crisis would have been felt with less force.  
Ruding then asked what could be done in order to increase 
market discipline. For a long time, the issuance of subordinated 
bonds was considered advantageous for several reasons (e.g. 
as a less expensive form of capital that investors can judge 
according to the risk profile of the issuer). In reality, however, 
such bonds did not lead to the market discipline anticipated. 
Therefore, the amended Basel rules will most likely sharply 
curtail the acceptance of subordinated bonds as Tier I capital. 
Having said this, new techniques for subordinated bonds have 
recently been tested, where a debt-equity swap is compulsory 
in case a bank’s capital ratio falls below a certain level. This 
scenario  would  allow  subordinated  debt  to  continue  being 
treated  as Tier  I  hybrid  capital. According  to  Ruding,  such 
issuances  would  be  advantageous,  as  they  would  lead  to 
increased  contingent  capital,  i.e.  raise  the  capital  buffer  at 
exactly the time required. However, he doubts that the capital 
markets are willing to absorb substantial amounts of these. 
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The Volcker Rule
Ruding  continued  by  taking  a  closer  look  at  some  of  the 
proposals for banking reform. At the heart of the debate here, 
some  advocate  a  fundamental  regulatory  change,  whereby 
large banks are broken up and the legally permissible activities 
of regulated banks are strictly limited. The former Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve System, Paul Volcker, is an outspoken 
proponent of narrow banking as a way to solve the “too big to fail” 
dilemma. What he proposes does not go as far as the restrictions 
that were put in place under the Glass-Steagall Act. 
Ruding  criticized  the  ban  on  proprietary  trading  proposed 
by the Volcker Rule in order to end risky trading practices. 
Under this, banks would only be allowed to execute trading 
orders on behalf of clients, as part of the regular service they 
offer. All  other  trading,  collectively  considered  “proprietary 
trading”, would be legally prohibited. Ruding, however, pointed 
out that banks also function as market makers and, as such, 
play an important role in helping to keep financial markets 
well-functioning and liquid. To separate this vital role from pure 
proprietary trading is in practice very difficult. He also does not 
agree with the proposal to put a mandatory limit on the size 
(in terms of balance sheet) of banks. His argument here is that 
smaller banks are not inherently less risky, and that a string of 
small failures can aggregate to a heavy burden. Moreover, most 
recent small and mid-sized bank failures were caused by losses 
in traditional retail banking. It is an illusion to believe that the 
narrow banking proposed would eliminate the need for any 
rescue of regulated banks in the future. According to Ruding, 
a  further  argument  against  the  narrow  banking  approach  is 
that there are more effective ways to reduce the likelihood of a 
bank default, such as appropriate capital requirements, effective 
supervision, and accountability of shareholders and creditors.
Bank Taxes
Ruding then raised the discussion around the various proposals 
for taxes and levies on banks. Ruding emphasized that inter-
national  coordination  is  absolutely  imperative  to  retaining  a 
level playing field. He also warned against any permanent bank 
tax for which the proceeds generated have no clear purpose. 
Proponents of such a tax, such as the IMF, are convinced that it 
would discourage risk taking. Ruding, however, believes that it 
could in fact raise the risk profile of a bank, as this would need 
to generate more profits in order to compensate for the tax.
If a bank tax is imposed, Ruding is strongly in favor of transfer-
ring the proceeds into a stability fund for future emergencies. 
His preferred solution would be to create an emergency fund 
at the EU level, whereby banks contribute according to their 
risk profile.
He concluded his speech by outlining a number of dilemmas 
associated with banking reform: 1) some would prefer to focus
on  measures  that  punish  the  banking  sector,  while  others 
would emphasize measures to reduce the probability of future 
financial crises; 2) a variety of official measures may lead to an 
accumulation of reforms that heavily increases the burden of 
restrictions on the financial sector, and which eventually reduces 
the availability of credit to the private sector; 3) introducing
bank  taxes  might  weaken  support  for  the  tough  capital  and 
liquidity rules now being considered by the Basel Committee; 
4) differences in the outcome of banking reform in the U.S. 
and  Europe  may  result  in  an  uneven  playing  field  and  an 
absence of comparable conditions would imply a distortion of 
competition. 
According to Ruding, two opposing developments are currently 
taking place – a weakening in the drive for banking reform and 
a push in favor of excessive regulation. Which development will 
ultimately prevail is unknown, but the end results will certainly 
be a mixture of both these forces.
Lut De Moor (CFS)
Raghuram  Rajan  was  one  of 
the  few  economists  who  warned 
of the global financial crisis before 
it hit. Now, as the world struggles 
to recover, it’s tempting to blame 
what happened on just a few greedy 
bankers who took irrational risks 
and left the rest of us to foot the 
bill.  In  Fault  Lines,  Rajan  argues 
that serious flaws in the economy are also to blame, and 
warns that a potentially more devastating crisis awaits us if 
they aren‘t fixed.
Upcoming Event:
30 June 2010
Prof. Raghuram G. Rajan  
(The University of Chicago) 
will talk about his book 
“Fault Lines: 
How hidden fractures still 
threaten the world economy”22
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30 June 2010    
Fault Lines: How hidden fractures 
still threaten the world economy 
Prof. Raghuram G. Rajan 
(The University of Chicago, Booth School 
of Business)
 September 2010  
Wertpapierhandel im Umbruch: 
Chancen für Börsen  
und Ihre Kunden  
Dr. Reto Francioni 
(Vorsitzender des Vorstands, Deutsche 
Börse AG)
22 September 2010   
New Architecture for Financial 
Regulation (provisional title) 
Prof. Charles Goodhardt 
(London School of Economics and Political 
Science)
10 November 2010 
  Supervision of International 
Financial Markets 
José Viñals 
(Financial Counselor and Director, 
Monetary and Capital Markets Department, 
International Monetary Fund)
 December 2010  
Capital Requirements 
(provisional title) 
Nout Wellink 
(President, De Nederlandsche Bank)
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„Wiederaufbau der Finanzmärkte / Rebuilding Financial Markets“
Monetary Discipline, Global Currencies  
and the Crisis in Eastern Europe 
27 January 2010 
Adam Posen
CFS Lectures
In the wake of the financial market crisis, currency regimes have been – quite naturally – put under severe 
pressure. This holds true in particular – though to varying degrees – for “Emerging Eastern Europe”, as the 
varied region between the Czech Republic and the Baltics is sometimes called. Here, previously ample FDI 
inflows, which had fuelled domestic demand-led growth and significant current account deficits, suddenly 
reversed. With imbalances starting to unwind rapidly, and against the backdrop of an extraordinary increase in 
risk aversion, the pressure on interest rates and – concurrently – exchange rates became very significant.
The  speaker,  Adam  Posen,  is  a  senior  fellow  at  the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics and serves 
as an external member of the Bank of England’s Monetary 
Policy  Committee.  He  specializes  on  the  European  (in 
particular  German)  and  Japanese  economies  and  has 
authored  numerous  stimulating  and  influential  books 
and  articles  on,  among  other  issues,  inflation  targeting, 
the appropriate framework for monetary policy, as well 
as  the  international  monetary  system. The  lecture  was 
organized by Hans-Helmut Kotz (Deutsche Bundesbank), 
Jan Krahnen (CFS) and Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell (ECB) 
as part of a joint lecture series.
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Posen  began  his  presentation  by  outlining  three  points  for 
discussion. He first asked how much, in what way, and to what 
extent an economy (or a group/union of economies) with a 
global  “anchor”  currency  should  interact  with  surrounding 
countries.  Secondly,  he  highlighted  the  tradeoff  between 
monetary discipline and a closer integration with surrounding 
countries as a consequential problem. Finally, he commented 
on Central and East European countries and their connections 
with the euro zone.
Posen  argued  in  favor  of  encouraging  integration  between 
an anchor currency economy and its surrounding countries. 
The positive effects of such a policy for the reserve currency 
country  would  be:  1)  seigniorage  gains;  2)  the  advantage 
of  pricing  imported  goods  in  the  national  currency  and  of 
avoiding exchange rate fluctuations; 3) an increased inflow of 
foreign direct investments, information, education, etc.; and 4) 
the benefits arising from the so-called “exorbitant privileges” of 
being a global reserve currency. 
For  the  sake  of  completeness,  Posen  also  spoke  about  the 
arguments  raised  against  encouragement  of  integration 
and  in  support  of  the  narrow  monetary  discipline  view. 
According to him, some fear that a major issue for a reserve 
currency economy might be the risk of rising borrowing costs. 
Furthermore, he mentioned the potential risk of a currency 
overvaluation that could undermine export competitiveness, 
as well as the theoretical danger of a loosening of monetary 
control arising from an increase in the number of countries 
using the currency. 
Given that no firm evidence is presently available in support of 
these theories, he dismissed the contention that more resources 
flowing into a country (as a result of a deeper integration) are 
bad for its economy. For Posen, the only case in which this 
could apply is one of a huge institutional breakdown. Thus, he 
concluded that it is a better policy to encourage countries to 
be part of a currency zone.
Finally, Posen re-iterated the importance of a well-established 
and stable relationship between the reserve currency country 
and  surrounding  economies.  In  addition  to  that,  attracting 
more countries to join the currency zone should be a major 
goal. He also said that a deeper integration of the “center” 
with the “periphery” should be encouraged, as this would help 
increase the long-term benefits (both marginal and direct) of 
using a single currency for all participants. 
The  discussion  that  followed  was  moderated  by  Gertrude 
Tumpel-Gugerell. Posen answered questions from the audience 
concerning capital dislocation and currency crises, as well as 
the role and importance of institutionalizing the use of a single 
currency. 
      Daniela Dimitrova (CFS)
Th. Mayer (DB Research), G. Tumpel-Gugerell, A. Posen, H.-H.Kotz24
Events | Joint Lunchtime Seminars
The  first  presentation  was  held  by 
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (Goethe 
University). She presented a working 
paper entitled “Explaining the Low 
Labor Productivity in East Germany 
–  A  Spatial  Analysis”  (co-authored 
by R. Izem). The paper explores the 
comparatively low labor productivity 
in East Germany after the German 
reunification.  In  order  to  asses 
the relative importance of two factors that influence labor 
productivity  –  job  characteristics  (such  as  network  effects 
and firm size) and worker characteristics (i.e. human capital) 
– the authors develop a spatial structural model that predicts 
commuting behavior across the former East-West border and 
the resulting regional unemployment rates. The results indicate 
that a significant part of the human capital accumulated in the 
East  before  1990  was  transferable.  Hence,  differences  in 
human capital were not the reason for differences in labor 
productivity. On the other hand, the authors find that job 
characteristics differed significantly between East and West. 
The paper was discussed by Stephan Fahr (European Central 
Bank) and Ulf von Kalkreuth (Deutsche Bundesbank). 
Luca Dedola (European Central Bank) presented the second 
paper entitled “Financial Frictions, Financial Integration and 
the  International  Propagation  of  Shocks”  (co-authored  by 
G. Lombardo). During the recent financial crisis we could 
observe that shocks (like the subprime problem in the U.S.) 
in one country were transmitted to other countries. In this 
paper the authors develop a (quantitative) two-country model 
that helps to understand how the international transmission 
of asymmetric shocks is affected in the presence of levered 
cross-border  investors. They  find  that  foreign  exposure  in 
interconnected  balance  sheets  of  leveraged  investors  can 
indeed act as a powerful propagation mechanism of asymmetric 
shocks across countries. However, in their setting, financial 
and  real  interdependence  can  be  very  strong  even  with 
minimal balance sheet exposure to foreign illiquid assets, if 
financial markets are integrated. In her discussion, Ester Faia 
(Goethe University) commented on the use of a particular 
debt  contract  in  the  model  and  questioned  the  portfolio 
choice in the model.
The third session was a presentation 
by Martin Kliem (Deutsche Bun-
desbank) of a working paper entitled 
“Bayesian Estimation of a DSGE Model 
with Asset  Prices”  (co-authored  by 
H. Uhlig). The paper combines two 
strands of literature and presents an 
estimation  of  a  dynamic  stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
that explains both business cycle and 
asset  pricing  implications.  Until  recently  the  asset  pricing 
implications of business cycle models have not been explored 
in much detail and this paper is one of the first to introduce 
asset pricing in standard models. The authors use Bayesian 
techniques to estimate the DSGE with macroeconomic and 
financial time series and are able to explain simultaneously 
several macroeconomic and financial market facts. One of the 
main innovations of the paper is the introduction of second 
moments  of  asset  returns  into  the  estimation  procedure, 
which goes beyond the usual first order approximations used 
in business cycle studies. The paper was discussed by Ivan 
Jaccard (European Central Bank), who compared some of the 
models results to available data, and Mu-Chun Wang (Goethe 
University),  who  commented  on  technical  details  of  the 
model and the strategy for solving it numerically.
Martin Kliem
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Bundesbank-CFS-ECB Workshop on Macro and Finance 
9 October 2009 
House of Finance
Joint Lunchtime Seminars
In October 2009, a first “Bundesbank-CFS-ECB Workshop on Macro and Finance” was organized. The workshop 
brought together researchers from the Bundesbank, the European Central Bank, and Goethe University to 
present their research in the field of macroeconomics and finance.25
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Thomas Laubach (Goethe Univer-
sity  Frankfurt  and  CFS)  presented 
a  term  structure  model  to  explain 
movements  in  longer  term  interest 
rates. Instead of assuming that agents 
know  all  the  parameters  describing 
the model of the economy and that 
these  parameters  are  fixed  for  all 
time,  Laubach  and  his  co-authors 
Robert  J.  Tetlow  (Federal  Reserve 
System) and John C. Williams (Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco) introduce learning type agents into the model. In 
their paper “Learning and the Role of Macroeconomic Factors 
in the Term Structure of Interest Rates”, agents re-estimate 
model  parameters  using  a VAR  framework. The  purpose  is 
to  improve  the  performance  of  standard  macroeconomic 
models  with  respect  to  longer  term  yields  while  at  the 
same time keeping the model and expectation formation as 
simple as possible. The main finding of their analysis is that 
incorporating  real-time  learning  in  a  macro  finance  model 
has important implications for the path of risk-neutral yields 
and the price of risk compared to a standard model with fixed 
coefficients. On purely theoretical grounds, the authors view 
the learning model as providing a more realistic description of 
the real-time problem of pricing assets in an environment of 
structural change and imperfect knowledge. The analysis also 
indicates that the learning model provides a better fit to the 
data than that from the standard approach of assuming constant 
coefficients estimated over the full sample. The discussants of 
the paper were Michael Krause (Deutsche Bundesbank) and 
Oreste Tristani (European Central Bank).
The  next  paper  presentation  by 
Gianni  Amisono  (European 
Central  Bank)  also  dealt  with  the 
term  structure  issue. The  paper  “A 
DSGE  model  of  the  term  structure 
with  regime  shifts”  (co-authored 
by  O. Tristani)  attempts  to  explain 
time  variation  in  term-premia  and 
implements two features into a simple 
DSGE  model.  The  authors  explore 
the  ability  of  a  small  microfounded  model  with  nominal 
rigidities to match both macroeconomic and term structure 
data using a full-information estimation approach. They deviate 
from the DSGE literature in two respects. First, they rely on 
perturbation methods to solve the model up to a second-order 
approximation and then estimate the nonlinear reduced form. 
The  second  deviation  is  to  allow  for  heteroskedasticity  of 
macroeconomic shocks, due to the fact that selected parameters 
are assumed to be subject to regime switches. Estimating the 
model on quarterly U.S. data supports the idea of generating 
heteroskedastic shocks subject to regime shifts. The paper was 
discussed by Malte Knüppel (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Josef 
Holtmayr (Goethe University).
The final session of the workshop was 
a presentation by Alexander Schulz 
(Deutsche Bundesbank) of his paper 
entitled “Banking and Sovereign Risk 
in the Euro Area” (co-authored by S. 
Gerlach  and  G. Wolff). The  authors 
explore the main drivers of sovereign 
bond spreads in the euro area since 
the  introduction  of  the  common 
currency ten years ago (defining yield 
spreads as the difference between sovereign bonds between 
euro area countries and the German sovereign bond yield). 
In their panel analysis they show that sovereign risk is affected 
by the banking sector. They find that a high risk factor leads 
to a pronounced widening of sovereign spreads in countries 
with large banking sectors and high leverage in the banking 
sector. The authors also show that government debt levels as 
well as forecasts of future fiscal deficits are other determinants 
of spread widening. Finally, in light of the financial crisis, the 
paper addresses certain policy issues, by looking at the impact 
of equity ratios of the banking sector on sovereign spreads. 
The authors find that countries, where bank equity buffers are 
relatively small have to pay a larger sovereign risk premium 
with increasing aggregate risk. Banks should thus be required 
to exhibit a higher equity ratio in order to decrease unfavorable 
effects to sovereign risk. This requirement becomes even more 
important in countries with a large banking sector.
Thomas Laubach
Gianni Amisono
Alexander Schulz
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The Joint Lunchtime Seminars are weekly research lectures jointly organized by the CFS, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and the ECB. The speakers present their current research findings to a selected circle of central 
bankers and macroeconomists. In the first half year of 2010, the organizing institutions have hosted the 
following speakers:
Joint Lunchtime Seminars
13 Jan 2010    Forecasting Inflation  
Using Dynamic Model Averaging 
Gary Koop (University of Strathclyde)
20 Jan 2010    Debt Portfolios 
Thomas Hintermaier (University of Mannheim)
27 Jan 2010    Risk Heterogeneity and Credit Supply: 
Evidence from the Mortgage Market 
Paolo Surico (London Business School)
10 Feb 2010    Hyper-Spherical and  
Elliptical Stochastic Cycles 
Tommaso Proietti (Universitá di Roma)
17 Feb 2010    Dynamic Specification Tests  
for Static Factor Models 
Gabriele Fiorentini (University of Florence)
24 Feb 2010    Robustness, Information-Processing 
Constraints, and the Current Account in Small 
Open Economies 
Eric Young (University of Virginia)
03 Mar 2010    Would Some Model Please Give Me Some 
Hints? An Empirical Investigation on 
Monetary Policy and Asset Return Dynamics 
Charles Leung (City University of Hong Kong)
17 Mar 2010    Explaining Macroeconomic and Term 
Structure Dynamics Jointly in  
a Non-linear DSGE Model 
Martin Andreasen (Bank of England)
24 Mar 2010    Financial Intermediation, Asset Prices,  
and Macroeconomic Dynamics 
Emanuel Mönch (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
31 Mar 2010    The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the 
Euro Area: Has It Changed and Why? 
Stefano Neri (Bank of Italy)
14 Apr 2010    Rational Price-Contingent Trading and  
Asset Price Dynamics 
Katrin Tinn (University of Essex)
05 May 2010    Cyclical Risk Aversion, Precautionary  
Saving and Monetary Policy 
Bianca De Paoli (Bank of England)
12 May 2010    Optimal Inattention to the Stock Market with 
Information Costs and Transaction Costs 
Janice Eberly (Northwestern University)
19 May 2010    Lessons from the History of Bank
  Examination and Supervision in the U.S. 
  163-200 
  Eugene White (University of Rutgers)
26 May 2010    Risk Appetite and Exchange Rates 
Tobias Adrian (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
2 June 2010    Social Value of Information in  
a Levered Economy 
Paolo Volpin (London Business School)
9 June 2010    Firms´ Cash Holdings and the Cross-Section of 
Equity Returns 
Berardino Palazzo (Boston University)
23 June 2010  Credit Supply and the Price of Housing
  Jean Imbs (HEC Lausanne)
30 June 2010    A Comparison of Seven Crises:  
Coskewness Contagion Testing 
Renee Fry (The Australian National University)
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Interconnectedness of Financial Institutions:  
Microeconomic Evidence, Aggregated Outcomes  
and Consequences for Economic Policy 
26 May 2010 
House of Finance
CFS Conferences
In  her  opening  remarks,  Claudia 
Buch  emphasized  the  importance 
of  new  research  methodologies 
and  empirical  work  using  micro-
data  that  aim  at  bridging  the  gap 
between microeconomic evidence and 
aggregate outcomes. 
The first presentation by Alexander 
Popov (ECB) looked at how financial 
distress of banks in central and eastern European countries 
affected  the  financing  of  local  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). In his paper entitled “Cross-Border Banking 
and the International Transmission of Financial Distress during 
the Crisis of 2007-2008” (co-authored by G. Udell), survey 
data from the period 2005 and 2008 are used. The authors 
separate the effects coming from bank loan supply shifts from 
the effects due to recession-driven demand shifts. They find 
strong evidence that a low equity ratio, a low Tier I capital 
ratio, and losses on financial assets lead to credit tightening. 
They also find that foreign banks transmit a larger share of the 
same financial shock than domestic banks, and that the decline 
in credit is greater among high risk firms. The discussant of the 
paper was Steven Ongena (CentER, Tilburg University)
The next session started with a presentation by Alfred Lehar 
(University of Calgary) of his paper “Macro-prudential Capital 
Requirements and Systemic Risk” (Co-authors: C. Gauthier, M. 
Souissi). After  comparing  alternative 
mechanisms for allocating the overall 
risk of a banking system to its member 
banks, the authors use a unique data 
set  of  the  Canadian  banking  system 
to  analyze  how  banks’  individual 
capital  requirements  would  change, 
when they are a function of a bank’s 
contribution  to  systemic  risk.  The 
authors  find  that  macro-prudential 
capital  allocations  can  differ  by  up  to  50%  from  observed 
capital levels and that this re-allocation would reduce default 
probabilities of individual banks as well as the probability of a 
systemic event by about 25%. The discussant of the paper was 
Peter Raupach (Deutsche Bundesbank).
The  following  paper,  about  “Allocating  Systemic  Risk  to 
Individual Institutions”, was presented by Nikola Tarashev 
(Bank  for  International  Settlements,  Co-authors:  C.  Borio, 
K. Tsatsaronis). The  authors  propose  the  Shapley  value  to 
measure  institutions’  systemic  relevance  and  demonstrate 
the interactions between several drivers of systemic risk such 
as size, an institution’s risk profile and strength of exposure 
to common risk factors. Applying their approach to various 
examples they demonstrate how the methodology can be used 
to calibrate macro-prudential capital rules. The discussant of 
the paper was Christian Ewerhart (University of Zurich).
Claudia Buch Alexander Popov
The current crisis has intensified the discussion about the consequences of changes in the financial system, and 
in particular of a greater degree of interconnectedness of financial institutions. These changes have implications 
for bank behavior, financial stability, financial regulation, economic welfare, and the monetary transmission 
process. Empirical work has increasingly been dedicated to this debate. The Bundesbank and the Center for 
Financial Studies, together with Claudia Buch from the University of  Tübingen and Mathias Hoffmann from the 
University of Zurich, organized a workshop to discuss related issues.2
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During the lunch break, three poster sessions were organized: 
“Asset Pricing in the Presence of Social Interaction” by Frederik 
König (University of Frankfurt); “Macroeconomic Factors and 
Systemic  Risk  in  Banking. A  FAVAR Approach”  by  Esteban 
Prieto  (University  of Tübingen);  and “Rethinking  the  Risk-
Competition Nexus for Banks: The Role of Internationalisation” 
by Cathérine Tahmee Koch (University of Zurich).
The afternoon program started with 
a presentation by Götz von Peter 
(Bank for International Settlements) 
on  Interbank  Tiering  and  Money 
Center  Banks.  In  his  paper  (jointly 
with  B.  Craig),  he  supplies  strong 
evidence of interbank tiering – when 
money  center  banks  intermediate 
between  other  banks  that  do  not 
transact  directly  –  in  the  German 
banking system. Moreover, they find that bank specific features, 
such as balance sheet size, help explain how banks position 
themselves in the interbank market.
Lydian Medema (University of Groningen) presented the 
next paper “Peer Monitoring or Contagion? Interbank Market 
Exposure and Bank Risk” (co-authors: M. Koetter, R. Koning, 
I. van Lelyveld, F. Liedorp). The authors use a spatial lag model 
to  test  whether  interbank  connectivity  acts  as  a  contagion 
channel and affects individual bank risk. Using quarterly data 
from the Dutch interbank market between 1998 and 2008, 
their results support the “contagion hypothesis”.
Ester  Faia  (Goethe  University)  presented  the  final  paper 
of  the  day,  “A Tale  of Two  Policies:  Prudential  Regulation 
and Monetary Policy with Fragile Banks” (co-authored by I. 
Angeloni). They analyze the role of banks in the transmission of 
shocks, the effects of monetary policy when banks are exposed 
to  runs,  and  the  interplay  between  monetary  policy  and 
Basel-like capital ratios. The authors find that the best policy 
combination includes mildly anticyclical capital ratios and a 
response of monetary policy to asset prices or leverage.
The  workshop  was  followed  by  a  2-day  conference  at  the 
Training Center of the Bundesbank in Eltville.
Götz von Peter
International Research Forum on Monetary Policy
Sixth Conference 
26–27 March 2010 
Washington D.C.
A panel discussion was held on “Structural Economic Modeling: 
Is it Useful in the Policy Process?” The panelists were Olivier 
Blanchard (Chief Economist, IMF), James Bullard (President, 
FRB St. Louis), and Lucas Papademos (Vice President, ECB). 
It was moderated by Steven Kamin (FRB). Keynote Speeches 
were held by Daniel Tarullo (Governor, FRB) and Athanasios 
Orphanides (Governor, Central Bank of Cyprus)
The sixth conference organized by the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy (IRFMP) was held 
at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington D.C. The purpose of the IRFMP is to promote the discussion of 
innovative research on theoretical and empirical macroeconomic issues relevant for monetary policy. The Forum 
is sponsored by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Center for Financial 
Studies (CFS), and the BMW Center for German and European Studies (CGES) at Georgetown University. The 
organizers of this year’s conference were: Matthew Canzoneri (Georgetown University), Günter Coenen (ECB), 
Christopher Erceg (FRB), and Volker Wieland (CFS).29
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2nd International Conference: 
The Industrial Organization of Securities Markets: 
Competition, Liquidity and Network Externalities 
2–29 June 2010 
Frankfurt
CFS Conference Announcements
The  securities  markets  landscape  has  been  changing  quite 
significantly over the last years, through the increase of compe-
tition, the advancement of technology and the restructuring of 
the industry. This process depends heavily on the characteristics 
of the industry within the individual layers of the entire value 
chain (trading, clearing and settlement). The industrial organi-
zation of securities markets will keep on evolving, as the value 
chain will be impacted by regulatory changes. In the European 
Union initiatives such as the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) or the clearing and settlement industry‘s 
Code of Conduct, and in the USA the Regulation NMS are 
already challenging the industry of securities markets.
The aim of the conference is to shed light on all aspects of 
the industrial organization of securities markets. This not only 
includes trading but also clearing and settlement services, and 
both cash and derivative markets.
The organizers are:
Peter Gomber, Goethe University Frankfurt and E-Finance Lab
Martin Reck, Deutsche Börse AG
Erik Theissen, University of Mannheim and Center for Financial 
Studies
The ECB and Its Watchers XII 
9 July 2010 
Frankfurt
This year, “The ECB and Its Watchers” Conference will take 
place  in  Frankfurt  on  9  July  2010. The  list  of  conference 
speakers  will  include,  from  the  ECB  side,  President  Jean-
Claude Trichet, Vice President Vítor Manuel Constâncio, and 
the Board Members Jürgen Stark and Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi. 
They will be joined by John Lipsky (First Deputy Managing 
Director of the IMF), Charles Goodhart (London School of 
Economics), Anil  Kashyap  (University  of  Chicago),  Rakesh 
Mohan (former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India 
and Yale University), Eduardo Loyo (former Deputy Governor 
of the Central Bank of Brazil and BTG Pactual), and Charles 
Wyplosz (Graduate Institute Geneva).
Topics to be discussed include macroeconomic imbalances and 
fiscal adjustment in the euro area, the case for strengthening 
the  role  of  money  and  credit  aggregates  in  central  bank 
strategy, needed reforms in financial regulation and supervisory 
practices, as well as new perspectives on central banking from 
emerging markets.
As usual, attendance to the conference is by invitation only. The 
complete conference program can be found on our website. 
The next CFS Newsletter will have more on this event!30
DEGIT XV
Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade 
3–4 September 2010 
Frankfurt
The  organizing  institutions  of  this  year’s  event  are:  the 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of Goethe 
University  Frankfurt,  the  Center  for  Financial  Studies,  the 
Department  of  Environmental  Business  Economics  at  the 
University of Southern Denmark, and the Kiel Institute for the 
World Economy.
The organizers are:
Erich Gundlach, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Rainer Klump, Goethe University Frankfurt
Bjarne S. Jensen, University of Southern Denmark
Special  emphasis  was  put  on  papers  focusing  on  general 
equilibrium, growth and models of large trading economies, 
and  also  on  research  about  the  roles  of  financial  stability, 
global and regional trade patterns, foreign direct investment, 
and international governance. A subset of the papers that will 
be  presented  at  the  conference  will  also  be  considered  for 
publication in an international journal, subject to the usual 
review process and approval by the Editorial Board.
Keynote speakers at the conference will be:
Samuel S. Kortum, University of Chicago
Olivier de La Grandville, University of Geneva
	 	 Further details about the conference program will 
soon be posted on the CFS website. For registration 
and accommodation, please contact Anne Jurkat 
  Email: jurkat@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de
 
For further information about the DEGIT    
conferences and related publications, please visit the 
DEGIT homepage: www.degit.ifw-kiel.de
DEGIT 2010 is the fifteenth event in a sequel of conferences on the same topic. Previous conferences were held 
in Denmark (1996), Hong Kong (1997), Taiwan (199), Tilburg (1999), Rome (2000), Vienna (2001), Cologne (2002), 
Helsinki (2003), Reykjavik (2004), Mexico City (2005), Jerusalem (2006), Melbourne (2007), Manila (200), and 
Los Angeles (2009).
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CFS Conference on Household Finance 
23–24 September 2010 
Athens, Greece
CFS  is  organizing  a  conference  on  Household  Finance  this 
fall. The objective of the conference is to present state-of-the-
art empirical research and empirically motivated theoretical 
research on household financial behavior over the life cycle, 
and on how this is influenced by other choices, government 
policies,  and  the  overall  economic  environment. The  main 
research areas of the conference are:
•  Patterns of asset and debt behavior over the life cycle 
•  Financing retirement and the demographic transition
•    Consumer indebtedness, including mortgages, and financial distress
•  Behavioral approaches to household finances
•  Financial literacy and the role of professional advice
•    Trust, subjective expectations, pessimism, and portfolio choice
•    International comparisons of household finances using micro-data
The  conference  will  include  a  panel  session  on  the  Greek 
financial crisis and its implications for financial behavior and 
financial  markets.  We  are  pleased  to  announce  that  Lucas 
Papademos (former Vice President of the ECB) has confirmed 
his participation in the panel.
	 	 Further details about the conference program will 
soon be posted on the CFS website. For registration 
and accommodation, please consult our website or 
contact Francesca Gradi, Email: gradi@ifk-cfs.de31
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New staff members
Florian Hense is research assistant at the Center for Financial Studies since April 2010. After graduating in 
Economics at the LMU Munich, he became a doctoral student within the Graduate Program “Finance and Monetary 
Economics” at Goethe University in October 2008. Florian Hense is working for the CFS Financial Center Index. 
He is responsible for public relations and the development of the panel.
Oana Maria Georgescu joined the Center for Financial Studies in June 2010 as a researcher for a 
new project under the supervision of Prof. Laux. The project „Rechnungslegung und Prozykliziät 
– Implikationen für Finanzstabilität und Regulierung“ deals with the link between fair value accounting practices 
and procyclicality. Prior to this, Oana graduated with a Master of Science in Quantitative Economics from Goethe 
University. After her studies, she worked in Risk Management for KfW Bank in Frankfurt.
Keynote Speaker
Douglas W. Diamond 
(University of Chicago
Booth School of Business)
European Finance Association
25-28 August 2010
37th Annual Meeting
Frankfurt am Main
Germany
European Finance Association Registration         www.efa2010.org 
Florian Hense
Oana Maria Georgescu
We are pleased to welcome you to the EFA 2010 Annual Meeting in Frankfurt, the financial centre of 
Europe‘s largest economy and home to most of the players in its financial sector. Frankfurt is the most 
internationally-minded city in the country, and the only European city hosting two Central Banks (ECB 
and Bundesbank) and two Supervisory Authorities (Ceiops and BaFin). But it also is full of museums 
and universities. Goethe University’s House of Finance on its newly built Westend Campus hosts many 
researchers in finance, money and financial law.
The EFA 2010 Annual Meeting will provide new options for academic networking 
and collaboration on an international scale, as well as deepening the dialogue with 
practitioners in finance and policy makers.
Senior Fellow
Hans-Helmut Kotz is since May 2010 a Senior Fellow at CFS – with which he has been affiliated since the 
mid 1990s. Over the last years (since 2003) he has organized, jointly with Prof. Jan Krahnen and Dr. Tumpel-
Gugerell (Member of the ECB Board) a CFS Luncheon Seminar series. He also is the designated Chairman of 
the CFS Research Advisory Council. As a Senior Fellow he will work, together with colleagues, on a number of 
policy-oriented issues, mainly touching upon financial market regulation. He also teaches at Freiburg University 
and, since this term, Université Paris-Sorbonne-Cité (Paris 13). 
Before joining CFS, Prof. Kotz was a Board Member of Deutsche Bundesbank (2002-2010), in charge of Financial Stability, 
Markets and Statistics and as such a member of a number of committees and working groups of the Bank for International 
Settlements, the Financial Stability Board as well as the OECD, where he is acting chair of the Financial Markets Committee. 
He was also the Central Bank Deputy for the G7 and the G20 process. Before that, he was President of the Landeszentralbank 
in Bremen, Niedersachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt (1999-2002) and Chief Economist at Deutsche Girozentrale. Between 2002 and 
2005 he served in a personal capacity as a member of the European Parliament’s Expert Group on Financial Markets. He has 
published widely (Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Revue d’Economie Financière, Intereconomics etc. as well as in numerous 
edited books). Prof. Kotz is moreover involved in a number of academic institutions, e.g., member of the Board of the Konstanz 
Seminar on Monetary Theory, the scientific councils of the Centre Cournot, Paris, as well as the Hamburger Weltwirtschaftliches 
Institut (HWWI), Hamburg. 
Hans-Helmut KotzAon Jauch & Hübener GmbH, Frankfurt; Bank of Japan, Frankfurt; Barclays Bank Plc, Frankfurt; BDO Deutsche Warentreuhand AG, Frankfurt; 
Berenberg Bank, Hamburg; BHF-BANK Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt; Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V., Berlin; Degussa Bank GmbH, 
Frankfurt; Delbrück Bethmann Maffei AG, Frankfurt; Deutsche Postbank AG, Bonn; Die Sparkasse Bremen AG, Bremen; Ernst & Young GmbH, 
Eschborn; Frankfurter Volksbank eG, Frankfurt; Franz Haniel & Cie. GmbH, Duisburg; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Frankfurt; Fritz 
Knapp Verlag, Frankfurt; Goldman Sachs International, Frankfurt; Hauck & Aufhäuser Privatbankiers KGaA, Frankfurt; HeidelbergCement 
AG, Heidelberg; HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG, Düsseldorf; IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, Frankfurt; infoscore Forderungsmanagement 
GmbH, Baden-Baden; KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt; KPMG AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, Frankfurt; Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank, 
Frankfurt; Maleki Communications GmbH, Frankfurt; Maple Bank GmbH, Frankfurt; McKinsey & Company, Inc., Frankfurt; Morgan, Lewis & 
Bockius LLP, Frankfurt; PricewaterhouseCoopers AG, Frankfurt; Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. KGaA, Köln; SEB AG, Frankfurt; UBS Deutschland 
AG, Frankfurt; Union Asset Management Holding AG, Frankfurt; Versicherungskammer Bayern, München; VICTORIA Versicherung AG, 
Düsseldorf; Westdeutsche ImmobilienBank, Mainz; WM Gruppe, Frankfurt.
Franz Amesberger; Raimund Bär; Dr. Andreas Bascha; Martin Bloch; Prof. Alexander Dürr; Dr. Bettina Eisenächer; Dr. Robert E. Fiedler; 
Thomas Fischer; Christoph Martin Klein; Markus Kopyciok; Thomas Krahnen; Dr. Matthias Larisch; Bernd Mack; Andre P.H. Müller; Dr. 
Frederik Pajunk; Karsten Rixecker; Dr. Christian Schiller; Dr. Michael Schüllermann; Thomas Seidel; Bledar Striniqi; Dr. Uwe Vielmeyer; 
Dietmar Vogelsang; Dr. Markus Warncke; Martin Wilhelm; Dr. Peter Wilke; Dr. Jens Zinke.
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